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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF MARKET INFORMATION ON STOCK MARKETS: 
 
R&D, Patents and Money Illusion 
 
 
Kwasi Osei-Yeboah 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation identifies patents and R&D expenditures as firm-level information variables, and 
investigates how they affect the pricing of assets in the stock market.  In the first essay, the question 
as to whether patents and R&D represent adverse selection risk is investigated. Firms investing in 
patents and R&D may present an uncertain outcome for investors who do not have the privilege of 
insider information. This may increase the adverse selection cost for uninformed investors.  For the 
uninformed investor to hold stocks with more private information, he must be compensated for 
taking on more firm characteristic risk. The empirical results show that patents and R&D activities 
imply higher average returns. Further evidence illustrates that the return premiums for patents and 
R&D show differences in their information structures. Patents appear to reduce the degree of 
asymmetric information and lower the extent to which R&D affects average returns. Patents by a 
firm appear to represent increased exposure to a priced systematic risk factor. The second paper 
evaluates abnormal returns from a trading strategy that selects stocks on the basis of previous 
patents issued to firms. The cumulative abnormal returns due to previously issued patents reflect 
a revision of the firm’s expected returns resulting from future price correction.  Evidence 
presented in the essay suggests the possibility of a systematic-risk-based explanation to the 
abnormal returns from patent-based trading strategies.  The third paper extends the Modigliani-
Cohn hypothesis to the international context. The paper argues on the basis of increasing 
interdependence of the world financial markets, and the dominant role played by the US market 
that, if the US stock market suffers from money illusion, then the developed international 
markets must also suffer from money illusion.  The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1. General Overview of the Dissertation 
 
The 1933 securities act, “truth in securities”, has two key canons.  One, it 
requires that investors receive financial and other significant information 
concerning securities being offered for public sale. Two, it prohibits 
deceit, misrepresentations and other fraud in the sale of securities. 
 - Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
The availability of firm-level information matters for stock returns and it is an issue that 
continues to receive attention in the finance literature.  There is a growing body of literature 
on the role firm-level information plays in our general understanding of how assets are priced 
on the stock market. Intuitively, one may expect that disclosure of information reduces the 
uncertainty of the information environment faced by investors, hence lowers the 
compensation to investors for holding these stocks. Conversely, increased private information 
may increase the uncertainty faced by investors, and investors must be compensated for 
holding stocks that allow more private information. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show 
that the reduction in information asymmetry by revealing public information can reduce a 
firm’s cost of capital. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) show in their model that 
trading stocks with more possibilities for private information produce higher stock 
returns.   
The issue of interest addressed in the second chapter of the dissertation is the 
contribution of patents and R&D spending in the discussion of firm-level information. 
There has been substantial work done by economists to include R&D spending as a 
capital investment in the national account. Many economists believe R&D is a significant 
source of economic growth. Work by Fraumeni and Okubo (2005), Okubo et al (2006) of 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), de Haan (2004) of the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) in the Netherlands and other economists at the Australia Bureau of 
Statistics have published work in support of this effort. Firms commit to R&D with the 
hope that the investment would pay off leading to greater profit. The question asked is 
whether increased R&D spending of firms changes the information environment of the 
firm. Many of the investments made by firms in R&D do not yield any benefit. More so, 
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firm do not report progress made in their R&D activities, partly to protect their 
investments. From the perspective of an outsider who does not have the benefit of insider 
information, increased firm R&D spending increases private information associated with 
the firm’s stock. Patents could be described as a product of firm research and 
development activities. The firm receives the exclusive right to use (sell) the patent and 
profit from it for 20 years subject to renewal. However, a key requirement of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office is for all information about the patent to be made 
publicly available. This key requirement may affect the information environment of firms 
actively engaged in patents. In a sense, the question is whether R&D and patents 
represent adverse selection risk and whether this risk is priced in the stock market. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation investigates increases in adverse selection risk for 
firms investing in patents and R&D activities. Investment projects with uncertain benefits 
increase private information and impose an adverse selection cost on uninformed 
investors. Informed investors could take advantage of superior information to profit from 
holding stocks with higher private information. Uninformed investors would accordingly 
require higher overall stock returns to hold stocks with increased private information. I 
show here that increases in patents and R&D activities imply higher average returns. The 
return premium behaves as the characteristics premium noted in Daniel and Titman 
(1997) but attributable to an adverse selection risk, borne by the uninformed investors. 
The adverse selection risks due to patent activities display a different information 
structure as compared to that of the risks of R&D activities. Patents appear to reduce the 
degree of asymmetric information and lower the extent to which R&D affects average 
returns. Patents by a firm show evidence of representing a priced systematic risk factor. 
Chapter 3 continues the discussion on firm-level market information by 
specifically looking at patents. If the market is unable to make an accurate prediction of 
the value of firm patents, then there would be future corrections as information becomes 
less noisy. Future price correction could be captured by implementing trading strategies 
that select stocks on the basis of previously issued firm patents. The cumulative abnormal 
returns would reflect a revision of a firm’s expected returns resulting from future price 
correction as in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
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Chapter 4 uses the money illusion hypothesis to highlight how information 
transmission from one market could significantly influence market outcomes in other 
economies. The chapter extends the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis to the international 
context. It argues on the basis of increasing interdependence of the world financial 
markets, and the dominant role played by the US market that, if the US stock market 
suffers from money illusion, then the developed international markets must also suffer 
from money illusion.  The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. 
This dissertation lends support to the side of the finance literature that advances 
the view that information asymmetry may not be fully diversifiable in an economy with 
large numbers of risky assets, as otherwise suggested by Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007). 
Many researchers report empirical evidence showing the relationship between 
information quality and the cost of capital. Among them, Botosan (1997) and Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002) examine the relation between the cost of capital and the information 
disclosure level and find that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity 
capital. Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) use eight proxies for earnings 
quality and show that firms with lower earnings quality have a higher cost of capital. The 
quality of firm’s accounting information matters. 
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Chapter 2. Do Patents or R&D Represent Adverse Selection 
Risk? 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The finance literature documents the process by which information affects asset pricing 
fundamentals. Easley and O’Hara (2004) present an empirical model, where they argue 
that differences in information between informed and uninformed investors affect the 
cost of capital. Informed and uninformed investors perceive risk differently, and that 
affects the risk-return trade-off leading to insider gains. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2002) also present evidence to show that stocks with higher probabilities of information-
based trading have higher rates of returns. Some attempts have been made to identify the 
sources of private information. Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that all firm-specific 
investment decisions serve as drivers of information asymmetry. They empirically tested 
research and development (R&D), as an example of such firm-specific driver of 
information asymmetry. However, it is not clear whether the effect of information on 
asset pricing models is due to the behavioral or rational views of the investor.  
Taking the cue from Easley and O’Hara (2004), I develop the argument that 
adverse selection risk due to firm-level decisions is a type of asymmetric information 
risk. This risk cannot be diversified away through portfolio formation, and the market 
pays a premium. This argument is consistent with Daniel and Titman’s (1997) notion of 
priced firm “characteristics”. However, Daniel and Titman (1997) imply that 
characteristics show up because prices are not determined by an equilibrium asset pricing 
model but instead by the actions of irrational investors. In this chapter, I show that, even 
though you get what looks like characteristics, you do have an equilibrium asset pricing 
model that does give a specific explanation (based on rational investor behavior) for why 
the characteristic is priced. The adverse selection risk is a one-sided risk1
                                                 
1 One-sided risk – putting your money at risk means you may lose it without compensation on the up side. 
This type of risk is disliked even by risk neutral investors. 
: for given mean 
return, informed investors do better on average, and for a given mean return, uninformed 
investors must do worse. To entice regular (uninformed) investors into the market, the 
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asset needs to have a higher mean return than implied by systematic risk alone. Then the 
market pays a premium for one-sided risk as a result of adverse selection risk 
 In this chapter, I empirically show that firm managers’ decisions to invest in 
Research and Development (R&D) generate adverse selection risk. Increased R&D 
increases uncertainty, and the uncertainty2
In this chapter, I address the question suggested by Aboody and Lev (2000) ‘Do 
all corporate investments create information asymmetries?’  To address this question, I 
contrast the effects of patents and R&D activities of firms on asymmetric information. A 
number of papers establish a direct relation between patents and R&D spending [e.g. 
Pakes and Griliches (1980, 1984) and Griliches, Pakes and Hall (1987)]. The expectation 
is that patents and R&D activities share the same information structure; hence they both 
must generate adverse selection risk due to information asymmetry. Patents could 
arguably be described as the product of successful R&D activities and may serve to 
reduce the degree of asymmetric information so that, in the presence of patent 
information, uninformed investors may not need to be compensated as much. In addition, 
the rules governing the issue of patents by US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
require full disclosure of information. Though the assignee gets the exclusive use and the 
right to profit from the product for twenty years subject to renewal, the patent 
information is made publicly available. Thus, increased patents may not increase adverse 
selection risk. The evidence put forward in the chapter suggests that R&D spending may 
capture the information contained in patents. The relationship between patents and 
returns turns negative when the R&D variable is included in the regression model. I show 
in the chapter that not all firm-level decisions create information asymmetry. Though 
patents correlate with uncertainty patents are not priced as firm-specific risk.  
 about the outcome of investment generates 
adverse selection risk. As evidenced in the literature, uncertainty is priced by the market. 
I further show that increased R&D spending leads to higher average returns. However, 
R&D spending is not priced systematic but priced firm-specific risk.  
This chapter bridges an important gap in the literature by establishing a linkage 
between firm-level decisions and firm-specific risk in explaining equilibrium asset 
                                                 
2 Papers by Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006), Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent 
(2003) among others have shown how uncertainty affects optimal decisions and asset prices. 
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pricing. The findings in the chapter may also offer an alternative explanation the pricing 
of idiosyncratic risk in the market.  
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows:  Section II 
provides the model and key hypotheses in which the research question is defined. Section 
III presents the data used for the chapter. Section IV provides the empirical results. 
Section V presents the robustness of the research findings. Section VI concludes the 
chapter.  
 
2.2 Model and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Defining the problem 
The chapter proceeds in two directions. First I examine the linkage between the 
firms’ patents and R&D activities and adverse selection risk. Based on the argument put 
forward by Easley and O’Hara (2004), increased patents and R&D activities must lead to 
higher average returns. Secondly, I address the question of whether patents and R&D 
activities are priced characteristics or priced systematic risk.  
The finance literature documents two types of nondiversifiable risk. The first is 
systematic (two-sided) risk priced by the market [Sharpe (1964), Kaufman and Scott 
(2003), Fama and French (1992, 1993)]. Two-sided risk is empirically evaluated for 
instance by considering the Fama-French model or the standard Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
formulation. The second is a one-sided risk, as is important for fixed income instruments 
due to the possibility of default but as also postulated for equity instruments by Easley 
and O’Hara (2004), who indicate that for given mean returns, if informed investors can 
do better on average, uninformed investor must do worse. Thus in a multi-asset rational 
expectation equilibrium setting with informed and uninformed investors, private and 
public information, uninformed investors consistently perform worse. For uninformed 
investors to be enticed into the market, and be properly compensated for holding assets 
with one-sided and nondiversifiable risk, the assets have to offer a higher overall mean 
return than implied by systematic risks alone. Easley, Hvidkyaer and O’Hara (2002) 
estimate the probability of information-based trading (PIN) as a proxy for asymmetric 
information and they present evidence that the PIN is positively and significantly related 
to mean returns. Jones and Slezak (1999) also present a theoretical model of the 
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asymmetric information effect on asset returns in which the variance of news and 
liquidity shocks over time affect agent portfolio holdings, and hence affect asset returns. 
The first research question addressed in this chapter is: Do all firm-level decisions 
that affect the information balance between insiders and outsiders generate adverse 
selection risk? This chapter looks at two firm-level decisions; one is firm-level decision 
to invest in R&D and the other is the decision to apply for patents. Patents and R&D 
activities share close similarities in their information structure, since potentially they may 
increase the investment opportunities of the firm. Pakes and Griliches (1980, 1984) and 
Griliches, Pakes and Hall (1986) find evidence to show that there exist a significant 
relationship between R&D and patent application. The information about their value and 
productivity is not shared with the public, and for an uninformed investor, holding stocks 
with more R&D spending or more patents may be taking additional risk. According to 
Aboody and Lev (2000), all such firm-level decisions must have higher average returns. 
In this regard, increased firm spending on R&D and patents increases private 
information. Insiders with the benefit of good information about firm patents and R&D 
would exploit this to their gain3
Do patents and R&D activities share the same information structure? According 
to Aboody and Lev (2000), patents and R&D must share the same information structure 
on the basis of the similarities between them. In this chapter, the effect of firm-level 
decision is investigated to be influenced by the nature of the information structure. In 
spite of the similarities between patents and R&D, they may not share the same 
information structure. It is without a doubt that R&D spending may increase firm’s 
asymmetric information risk to outsiders [Easley and O’Hara (2004)]. Aboody and Lev 
(2000) explain that the information about the value and productivity of firm’s R&D 
investment are not shared with the public. The US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) requires that all information about patents must be made public. The assignee 
gets exclusive use of the product for 20 years subject to renewal, but the information is 
. Subsequently, outsiders would have to be compensated 
for adverse selection risk with a premium in excess of the return-risk trade-off due to 
systematic risk.  
                                                 
3 Studies by Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976) all document varying levels 
of insider gains from private information ranging from 3 to 30 percent over a period of about three years. 
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made public. Coca-Cola for instead, keeps a tight-lip on its Coke formula; the company 
would not patent it because it does not want to share the formula with competitors. 
Kentucky Fried Chicken would not patent its chicken recipe because they do not want to 
reveal the formula, as would be required by USPTO.  
 The difference between R&D and patents may not only be because of the 
willingness to disclose information, but by the differences in the nature of their economic 
activities. Hence, the two variables may affect uncertainty differently. All private R&D 
expenditures can plausibly be treated as investment because these expenditures are all 
undertaken with the expectation of a commercial return and may obtain such returns. 
Hence, R&D may be described as an investment input and may not always add value to 
the firm. Patents may more likely be described as an asset [like intangible assets such as 
trademarks, etc.]. McCarthy and Schneider (1995) present a significant positive 
relationship between goodwill and the market value of a firm. Choi, Kwon and Lobo 
(2000) conclude that the level of intangible assets reported on the balance sheet is 
positively related to market valuation of firms’ equity. Therefore patents are an output of 
investment and may add value to the firm. In view of these differences, patents and R&D 
may convey different information. 
I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of patents received and R&D spending by a firm 
raises average returns on the firm’s equity. 
 
As argued by Easley and O’Hara (2004), assets with greater private information would 
cause uninformed investors to demand higher returns to hold stocks. Increased 
uncertainty raises the average returns of stocks. R&D spending by firms provides more 
private information to insiders, but increases the uncertainty for outsiders. Insiders may 
benefit from private information because they can rebalance their portfolios and hold 
stocks with more good information about the success of R&D activity. Outsiders are 
disadvantaged and for the market to entice them to hold stocks with more private 
information, they ought to be compensated with an additional premium. Outsiders are 
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therefore faced with more adverse selection risk due to increased R&D activities as a 
result of firm managers’ decisions.  
 There may be a systematic risk based explanation to increased average returns on 
firm’s equity due to higher level of patents received by a firm and R&D spending. 
According to Merton, anything that changes the investment opportunities of a firm may 
be priced as systematic risk. The patent and R&D factors may proxy for systematic 
changes in aggregate technology growth, which changes investment opportunities.  
The next question of interest is: Is the risk associated with increased patents and 
R&D priced as one-sided, two-sided, or no risk? The literature documents that R&D risk 
matters in asset pricing and that it is unlikely to be systematic risk. According to Daniel 
and Titman (1997), firm-level decisions generate a “characteristic” effect on asset 
returns. Aboody and Lev (2000) also argue that lack of market exchange for firm level 
characteristics like R&D makes it impossible to evaluate a market proxy for these risk 
factors. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  A higher level of patents received and R&D spending by a 
firm generates “characteristic risk” as defined by Daniel and Titman (1997) 
 
This research question is a follow-up on the first hypothesis. It is argued here that adverse 
selection risks due to firm-level decisions command a premium, and this is priced one-
sided risk. The hypothesis argues that an increase in adverse selection risk due to an 
increase in firm issued patents and R&D expenditure reflects higher average return and 
this may be firm characteristic risk. This question is empirically evaluated by running the 
characteristic model put forward by Daniel and Titman (1997). If the hypothesis reflects a 
characteristic view, then the R&D level and patent level variables should perform better 
than the R&D and patent factors4
 
 for explaining mean returns.  
Hypothesis 3:  A higher level of patents received and R&D spending by a 
firm is priced as systematic risk consistent with Merton (1973). 
 
                                                 
4 The R&D factor is estimated using the Fama-French factor formulation 
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Similarly, hypothesis 3 evaluates the systematic view. If patents and R&D spending are 
priced according to Merton’s framework, then the factors would perform better than the 
characteristic variables. The intuition behind this hypothesis is that patents and R&D 
spending would influence the productivity growth of firms, thereby increasing investment 
opportunities. 
The motivation behind the research question is to explore the sensitivity of the 
information structures of patents and R&D to asset pricing. Lev and Souigiannis, (1996, 
1999) argue that more R&D lowers mean returns since they appear to explain the Fama-
French value premium. Thus increased R&D spending implies more growth options and so 
less value. In this chapter, I look at firm R&D activities directly affecting the balance of 
information between private and public information. Chen, Golstein and Jiang (2007) 
argue that managerial investment decisions are influenced by private information 
reflected in stock prices. R&D activities are, among other things, investment decisions of 
managers. It can be empirically demonstrated that R&D spending leads to increased 
mean returns. This effect is different from that hypothesized by Lev and Souigiannis 
(1999); indeed it is one-sided risk as explained in detail in Easley and O’Hara (2004).  
Easley and O’Hara (2004) show that uninformed traders cannot diversify 
asymmetric information (one-sided) risk by holding more stocks of different firms. They 
end up holding more of stocks with bad news, and too little of stocks with good news. 
The risk associated with uninformed investor portfolio holding is one-sided risk, but not 
two-sided risk. The standard separation theorem does not hold here since uninformed and 
informed investors perceive different risk and returns. Thus private information induces 
one-sided risk and in equilibrium, investors require compensation for this risk. Jaffe 
(1974), Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986, 1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe 
(1990), and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999) present evidence from US data to show 
that insiders are better informed and earn positive abnormal returns from trading 
activities. According to Easley and O’Hara (2004), any firm decision that increases 
asymmetric information may have a cross-sectional effect on returns. Increases in firm 
R&D and patent activities may lead to increased asymmetric information. Insiders have a 
better sense of the growth opportunities or success of firm R&D and patent activities. We 
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can test the significance of R&D and patent variables on required returns as described in 
Easley and O’Hara (2004). 
2.2.2 Model Discussion 
I present a brief description of the basic idea behind the empirical model as detailed by Easley, 
Hvidjkaer and O’Hara (2002) in the Lintner (1969) setup below.  
Consider a two-period ( 1+t ) consumption-based asset pricing model with two 
states 2,1=s  at date 1+t . There are two assets with state contingent payoffs. Asset one 
pays 3 units of single consumption good in state 1 and zero in the other state; asset 2 pays 
3 units in state 2 and nothing in state 1. We assume an economy with one unit of each 
asset and consider two traders indexed 2,1=i . Each trader is endowed with one unit of 
the consumption good and with one-half of the available assets. Traders have log-utility 
of consumption at dates t and 1+t , and discount future utility with discount 
factor 10 << ρ . Trader si' belief5
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Where 2/)(1 21 ppw
i
t ++=  is the wealth at date t . 
3 scenarios are evaluated from this model. 
1. If both traders have common beliefs q , then equilibrium asset prices 
are ρss qp 2
* = . The shadow risk-free rate of return is 12/3 −ρ  and the expected payoff 
would be sq3 .  
                                                 
5 Beliefs are exogenous in the Lintner (1969) model and are not affected by market prices. 
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2. If traders differ in their beliefs, then the equilibrium price could be evaluated as 
ρss qp 2=  where )(2/1
21
sss qqq +=  is the average belief about the probability of state s . 
According to Easley, Hvidjkaer and O’Hara (2002), this is an example of the Lintner 
(1969) generalization of the CAPM to heterogeneous beliefs. Here, the traders choose to 
hold idiosyncratic risk. This happens because each trader believes that the asset is 
mispriced and is willing to accept some risk in order to take advantage of perceived 
mispricing. 
3. If trader 1 is correct about his belief, then the expected returns on asset s  
is 13 sq , and asset prices are not correct, thus are not equal to expected returns divided by 
risk-free rate. In this case, there is a positive excess return (expected return divided by 
price minus the risk-free rate) on one asset and negative excess return on the other asset. 
In this simplified model, even though there is no market-wide risk, there will be three 
units of the good in the next period. The adverse selection issues that arise will cause the 
trader with better information to hold a better portfolio and the trader with bad 
information will hold a worse portfolio. As pointed out by Easley, Hvidjkaer and O’Hara 
(2002), diversification will not eliminate this one-sided risk. The informed trader 
overweighs his investment in the assets with positive excess return. This shows that if 
investors perceive different risk-return tradeoff, they may choose to hold idiosyncratic 
risk.  
I relate the above model to R&D spending and patent activities. Looking at an 
illustrative example of Mylan Pharmaceutical drug research program, not much could be 
learned from their research spending compared to an FDA approved Bayer drug if you 
are an outsider. Insiders at Mylan may know what they hope to achieve, at what stage is 
the research and the likely success of the research program. However, if the FDA 
approves the drug, and more so if the drug hits the market, information becomes public 
and insiders may not have information advantage over outsiders. As stated by Aboody 
and Lev (2000), if a drug company’s research fails to pass clinical tests, that information 
is not shared with others. In a similar fashion, firm’s patent6
                                                 
6 USPTO classifies patents into three criteria 
 activity may contain private 
1. Utility patents, thus for new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement. 
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information. The patent application process requires full public disclosure of information 
and a guarantee of exclusive right. Outsiders may be uninformed about the nature of the 
patent, but an industry competitor may gain valuable information and be able to mimic 
the product. This may suggest any of the three things: 1. Patents may increase private 
information, 2. Patents may reduce private information or 3. Patents may not have any 
effect at all on private information.  Patents may also have the potential of creating a 
spillover situation where firms in the same industry may benefit from patents of 
competitors. Empirical evidence by Pakes and Griliches (1980, 1984) and Griliches, 
Pakes and Hall (1986) show significant co-movement in R&D activities and patent 
application. Patents and R&D activities may share the same or signal different 
asymmetric information. Patent may provide information that reduces the adverse 
selection risk of R&D activities. These are some of the questions this chapter hopes to 
explore.   
 If patents and R&D can proxy for information asymmetry, then increases in 
patents and R&D activities would increase adverse selection risk. Based on the above 
model, the hypotheses could empirically be tested by running time series and cross-
sectional regression of excess returns on R&D and patent variables. From Easley, 
Hvidjkaer and O’Hara (2002), I estimate 25 portfolio betas ( mktβˆ ) from the time series 
regression in equation 3. 
                  tt
p
t
pp
t
fp
t MKTMKTRR εββα +++=− −121                                              (2.3) 
mktβˆ  is the average of the two coefficients (betas) in equation 2.3. The use of 
contemporaneous and lagged market index is to correct for biases arising from 
nonsynchronous trading, as suggested by Dimson (1979). The estimated betas are then 
used in the cross-section regression together with patent (PATLEV) and R&D (RDMAT) 
variables to evaluate the effect of R&D and patents as proxies of asymmetric information. 
PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in a month, 
where the Total Asset is in units of millions. RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2. Design patents, thus for invention of a new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture. 
3. Plant patents, thus for the invention of or discovery and asexually reproduces any distinct and 
new variety of plant. 
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a firm to the Total Assets. Each firm is assigned the beta from the portfolio to which it 
belongs. In equation 4, I run firm-level cross-sectional regression. As a robustness check, 
I estimate individual firm betas from firm-level time series regression in equation 3. In 
this framework, I use the Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) approach where I assume a 
constant beta for each firm across time. For each month in the sample period 1970:01 – 
2001:12, I ran the following cross-sectional regression: 
iiii
mkt
ifi RDBMSIZERR ηγγγβγγ +++++=− 43210 ˆ                                      (2.4) 
From equations (2.3) and (1.4), MKT is the excess market return, itR is the return of stock 
i in month t  and fR is the risk free rate. If patent and R&D variables induce asymmetric 
information and adverse selection (one-sided) risk, then 4γ would be positive and 
significant. The implication of this test is that increases in patents and R&D activities 
may increase the private information of informed investors who can earn abnormal 
returns. But to entice uninformed investors, assets must offer higher mean returns in 
excess of what otherwise would have been earned for taking systematic risk. A situation 
that presents adverse selection risk corresponds to higher mean returns. 
Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) use a measure iψ
7
  
 to proxy for the 
asymmetric information variable, which is based on Roll (1988) and Morck, Yeung, and 
Yu (2000).  
21 ii R−=ψ                                                                                              (2.5) 
Where 2iR is the R-square ( iRsq ) from a CAPM first pass time series regression. I 
estimate iψ  for all 25 portfolios and run a cross-sectional regression of iψ  against patent 
and R&D variables. I also estimate firm level iψ , by estimating 
2
iR  from firm level time 
series. I then run a cross-sectional regression of estimated iψ  against the patent and R&D 
level variables. 
 
                                                 
7 Chen, Goldstien and Jiang (2007) use )1( 2iR−  to proxy for asymmetric information. Easley and O’Hara 
(2004) use PIN and other papers use 
)1(
)log(
i
i
Rsq
Rsq
−
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2.3 Data  
To test the various questions put forward in this chapter, I start by constructing patent and 
R&D variables. Patent data from Bronwyn Hall8 data library is merged with the 
COMPUSTAT annual data file and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
monthly data file. Although the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
have patent data covering the periods 1790 – 1976 and 1976 – 2007 on their website, it is 
difficult to extract and convert them for use in any meaningful analysis. However, the 
NBER 9and Bronwyn Hall have an on-going project to effectively merge all patent data 
to COMPUSTAT firms. Bronwyn Hall10
The size of a firm is measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals 
the stock price of the stock at the end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding. 
Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) at time t is 
calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market equity 
 provides patent data already linked to 
COMPUSTAT (gvkeys) firms that covers the periods from 1969 – 2001. The 
downloaded patent data are grouped into monthly issued patents for all the firms covered 
in the sample. With the compustat ‘gvkey’, the patent data is merged to an already 
merged compustat and CRSP data. The COMPUSTAT annual data is used instead of the 
quarterly frequency because the R&D data are reported more accurately on an annual 
basis [Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001)] and the annual frequency avoids 
seasonal issues. All price data and value data are converted to 2000 constant US Dollars. 
This is to control for time-varying changes in price. The CRSP monthly returns data 
cover NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Stocks priced lower than one dollar are 
eliminated from the sample. I exclude real estate investment trusts, stocks of companies 
incorporated outside the US, and closed-end funds. Stocks with less than three years 
continuous monthly data are also excluded. These data cleaning measures are consistent 
with acceptable practices in the literature [Easley et al (2002)]. The final sample consists 
of an unbalanced panel of COMPUSTAT and CRSP firms merged with patent data, 
covering the period 1970:01 to 2001:12. There are in all 151,525 firm month data points 
used in the sample and a total of 3,741 firms. 
                                                 
8 http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/index.html 
9 http://www.nber.org/patents/ 
10 http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/bhdata.html 
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(ME) at December of year t-1. The book-to-market equity ratios at time t are matched by 
the stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. Therefore there is at least a 6 
months’ lag between accounting data and market data. This allows for enough time for 
the firms’ accounting information to be released and fully disseminated in the market. 
The book value of equity is defined as the Total Assets minus Total Liability minus 
Preferred Stock plus Deferred Taxes plus Convertible Debt. This definition is based on 
the Kayhan and Titman (2007) formulation. The patent variable (PATLEV) and R&D 
variable (RDMAT) are constructed as follows. PATLEV is the ratio of the number of 
patents to Total Assets for each firm in a month. RDMAT is the ratio of R&D 
expenditure of a firm to the Total Assets, as done in Lev and Sougiannis (1996). Some 
papers suggest that R&D ought to be capitalized to take into account its amortized value. 
I estimate alternative capitalized R&D (RDCAP1 )11
There is noise in the patent and R&D data. Patents are described as an output of 
investment. This description is true if patents are viewed as the product of successful 
R&D.  However, there are instances in the finance data where certain firms have patents 
but have no R&D spending. These firms buy patents previously assigned to original 
owners or inventors. Some firms also report R&D spending but they do not have a single 
patent issued to them. A close inspection of the patent data shows that a significant 
number of non-public firms and institutions (including Universities and Colleges) are 
granted patents. Typically, these non-public and institutions patent the product of their 
research activities and they sell the patent to publicly-traded companies. Patents that are 
bought by firms may be described as an input investment instead of an investment output. 
R&D also has its associated noise. There may be differences across firm in reported R&D 
spending. Different firms may treat R&D related expenditure differently. Hall and Long 
(1999) use the confidential RD-1 survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the 
National Science Foundation and the data on R&D spending reported to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission by firms on their 10-Ks to show discrepancies in industrial 
R&D reporting. In view of these underlying issues and no direct link between a firm’s 
 variables that are used as robustness 
check [Lev and Sougiannis (1996)].  
                                                 
11 Lev and Sougiannis (1996) formulation 
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R&D and its patents in the data, this chapter relies on the overall statistical relation 
between the two key variables. 
The first set of 25 portfolios is formed by using book-to-market value and size. 
The sorting process follows the description discussed on Kenneth French’s data site12. 
The excess returns of the 25 portfolios are regressed on excess market returns and other 
key asset pricing factors [e.g. Fama and French (1993)], and I follow the Black, Jensen 
and Scholes (1974) method. Thus I estimate 25 market betas from the first stage (first 
pass) of the regression, and I assign the betas to corresponding firms in the portfolio. The 
second set of portfolios is formed based on industry criteria. Two portfolios are formed 
based on high R&D intensive two-digit sic-code industries (28, 35, and 36), and low 
R&D intensive industries (20, 24, and 33). The selection of high R&D intensive 
industries is based on Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001)13
 
, but I limit the criteria 
to two-digit sic-code industries. The criteria for selecting the three low R&D intensive 
industries are: 1. Industries should be in the manufacturing category, 2. Industries should 
have R&D expenditure at all data points, and 3. Industries should closely match the high 
R&D intensive industries. The selection of the low R&D intensive classification is such 
that it would be comparable to the high R&D intensive industries. Following Easley et al. 
(2002), I introduce the volume of stocks traded, and size as control variables.  
2.4 Empirical results  
2.4.1 Summary Analysis 
Table 1 presents a summary report of the 25 portfolios used in the study. Portfolios are 
formed by sorting firms on the basis of size and book-to-market value. Firms are first 
sorted into 5 size14 quintiles and within each size quintile, sorted into 5 book-to-market15
                                                 
12 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
 
quintiles to form 25 portfolios. The main variables of interest are RDMAT and PATLEV. 
As explained in the previous section, RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure to Total 
Assets, and PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in 
13 In Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001), they use a combination of three-digit and two-digit sic-code 
indurties. 
14  Firm size is computed as the log of market value of equity, where market equity is CRSP price multiply 
by the shares outstanding 
15 COMPUSTAT data; sum of (Data6,-Data181,-Data10,Data35,Data79) 
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a month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. RDCAP1 is used as an 
alternative measure of R&D intensity to check for robustness. The summary results 
provide a snap-shot of how the main variables (RDMAT, EXRET, PATLEV, RDCAP1) 
are distributed and how general characteristics of the data relate to the literature. Low 
book-to-market (growth) firms on average have lower mean excess returns than high 
book-to-market (value) firms. This finding is consistent with the value premium 
hypothesis documented by Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The sample considers firms investing in patents and R&D 
activities, and such firms tend to be large firm and especially in technology-oriented 
industries. Large-sized firms on average have higher returns than small-sized firms. This 
is contrary to what is generally reported in the literature [eg. Fama and French (1993)]. 
However, Zhang (2008) reports that in recent time, the size effect has changed and in 
most cases has reversed. The summary results on patent distribution also show that 
patents are heavily concentrated among large-sized firms. These may contribute to the 
reverse size-return effect reported in the data sample used for this study. The table reveals 
some linkage between patents (PATLEV) and excess returns. Large-sized firms and value 
firms tend to have more patents than small-sized firms and glamour firms. Table 2.1 may 
suggest cross-sectional linkages between the variables.  Thus value firm on average have 
higher returns, higher number of issued patents, and they spend more on R&D. 
 Previous works by Easley, Hvidjkaer and O’Hara (2002) and Aboody and Lev 
(2000) relate private information to firm size. They find evidence to suggest that private 
information tends to have a greater impact on price for small stocks than for large stocks. 
Table 2.2 presents summary results of returns of size-patent portfolios and size-R&D 
portfolios. In Panel A, firms are sorted into 5 size quintiles and within each size quintile, 
high and low patent portfolios returns are generated. On average returns increase from 
small-sized to large-sized portfolios, both for low and high patent. Similarly, in Panel B, 
firms are sorted into 5-size quintiles and within each size quintile, high, medium and low 
R&D portfolio returns are generated. A similar trend is observed as in Panel A, average 
returns increase from small-sized to large-sized portfolios.  
The two key proxies of asymmetric information under consideration in this 
chapter are PATLEV and RDMAT. Pakes and Griliches (1980, 1984) and Griliches, 
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Pakes and Hall (1986) show significant correlation between R&D expenditure and 
patents. The correlation matrix in Table 2.3 panel B shows 65% correlation between 
PATLEV and RDMAT. According to Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner (2004), correlation 
of over 80% are extreme to worry about collinearity. The 65% correlation between the 
two variables may not be large enough to worry about multicollinearity in the cross-
sectional models. 
2.4.2 Main results 
The first hypothesis in this chapter addresses the question whether firm issued patents 
and R&D spending affect the information balance between insiders and outsiders, and 
whether these activities generate adverse selection risk. As a first check of the hypothesis, 
patents and R&D are investigated to find out whether they contribute to increased private 
information. Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that all firm-level investment decisions must 
generate private information. By contrasting patents and R&D, I investigate whether the 
two firm-level investment decisions share similar information structure. The next check 
would be to establish that stocks with increased private information offer higher average 
returns. As argued by Easley and O’Hara (2004), investors must be compensated for 
holding stocks with more insider information, in excess of the rationally expected returns 
for systematic risk. 
2.4.2.1 Relationship between Patents and R&D, and asymmetric information 
Papers by Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006), Anderson, Hansen, and 
Sargent (2003) among others have shown how variance risk affects optimal decisions and asset 
prices. Prior research establishes a linkage between r-square as a measure of variance risk 
and private information. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) and Durnev, 
Morck, and Yeung (2004) present evidence using United States data to suggest that prices 
of low r-square stocks contain more public information. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), 
estimate )1( 2iR− to proxy for asymmetric information. Where 
2
iR is the estimated R-
square for each firm, and it is estimated from the time series regression of excess returns 
against the excess market portfolio and Fama-French three factors. The 
estimated )1( 2iR− , which is used to proxy for asymmetric information variable is then 
regressed against PATLEV and RDMAT. According to the expectation of the first 
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hypothesis, if patents and R&D spending generate more private information, then 
PATLEV and RDMAT would correlate with )1( 2iR− . 
The results in Table 2.4 panel A show that the R&D variable (RDMAT) is 
positively and significantly related to )1( 2iR− . This suggests that increasing R&D may 
increase the asymmetric information risk. The results in Table 2.4 panel C show a 
positive relation between PATLEV and )1( 2iR− , even when volume is controlled for in 
the model. Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) introduce size as a control variable. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) report that size and volume may proxy for asymmetric 
information. In panel B, volume is controlled for, to make sure that the correlation 
between patents and R&D, and )1( 2iR− is not capturing volume effects. When volume is 
controlled for in the respective models with PATLEV and RDMAT, both continue to be 
correlated with )1( 2iR− . However, when PATLEV, RDMAT and VOL are introduced as 
independent variables in the model, PATLEV becomes negatively related to the 
asymmetric information proxy. RDMAT is still positive and significant. It is quite clear 
that patent and R&D variables show significant correlation with the proxy for asymmetric 
information. 
2.4.2.2 Are Patents and R&D spending determinants of Asset Returns? 
Following Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), for each month in the sample period 
1970:01 – 2001:12, I run the cross-sectional regression model described in equation 2.4. 
Under the hypothesis, this model test whether RDMAT and PATLEV induce adverse 
selection risk and whether the risk is priced. To begin the analysis, two approaches are 
used to estimate firm betas. The first estimates portfolio betas from 25 equally-weighted 
portfolios formed based on size and book-to-market value. Post-ranking portfolio betas 
are estimated for the full period of the sample. Excess portfolio returns are regressed on 
contemporaneous and lagged excess market returns, as described in equation 2.3. The 
cross-sectional regressions are run with individual stocks, so individual stocks are 
assigned the beta of the portfolio to which they belong. This approach is used to allow for 
comparability with previous work in the literature [Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara 
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(2002)]. The second approach to estimating stock beta runs the Fama-McBeth time series 
regression and estimate individual betas for all the stocks in the sample. 
 Table 2.5 present the results of the cross-sectional regression, testing whether 
patents and R&D activities, generate adverse selection risk. The results are based on the 
empirical model iiiimktifi RDBMSIZERR ηγγγβγγ +++++=− 43210 ˆ . The hypothesis 
is that higher risk of information related to patents and R&D translate into higher 
required returns, so the interest is a significantly positive average coefficient on RDMAT 
or PATLEV. The results show that PATLEV is significant at the 90% confidence level in 
model 1. However, PATLEV is not significant when RDMAT is included in the analysis 
as reported in model 3. RDMAT is seen to be significant at the 99% confidence level. 
The results from the cross-sectional regression show that a 10% increase in R&D 
spending as a percentage of Total Asset, may lead to a monthly increase of 0.02% in 
excess returns. This translates to about 2.4% annually and economically it is significant. 
This may provide an indication that patents and R&D do not share the same information 
structure.  
2.4.2.3 Characteristic test of the Patents and R&D variables 
The second research question (hypothesis II) evaluates whether the associated increase in 
returns due to an increase in patents and R&D spending is market compensation for firm-
specific adverse selection risk. To allow for comparability with previous work, I follow 
the cross-sectional set-up of Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). Fama and French 
(1992) identify market beta, size, and book-to-market as determinants of cross-sectional 
variation in returns. Market beta is estimated using the following approach. Time series 
regression of individual16
                                                 
16 In the next section, the betas are estimated from 25 portfolios sorted by size and BM, and individual 
firms are assigned the beta for their respective portfolios. Because the portfolio compositions change each 
year, the individual stock betas vary over time. 
 firms based on the Black, Scholes and Jensen (1972) 
formulation is run and market betas estimated. The estimated firms’ betas together with 
PATLEV and RDMAT are used as the determinants in the cross-sectional regression. 
The results presented and discussed in Table 2.6 show that RDMAT significantly 
influence returns. According to Jagannathan and Wang (1998), in a cross-sectional 
framework, if a model is correctly specified, it may be sufficient to test the significance 
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of the coefficients by using the t-values to accept whether a variable is priced as firm 
characteristics.  .  
Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that in a cross-sectional model, the firm-
characteristic variable must perform better than the systematic factor variable.  I run the 
Daniel and Titman (1997) model with PATLEV and RDMAT, the firm-characteristic 
variables, and PATFACT17
2.4.2.4 Systematic test of the Patent factor and the R&D factor 
 and RDFACT, the systematic factor variable for patents and 
R&D respectively. Table 2.6 model 1 presents results based on PATLEV and PATFACT. 
The results show that the patent factor performs better than the characteristic patent 
variable. On the other hand, model 2 shows that RDMAT perform better than RDFACT. 
According to Daniel and Titman (1997), the firm-specific R&D variable (RDMAT) must 
be priced as a characteristic and the patent variable must be priced as a systematic risk.  
The third hypothesis proposes that the associated increase in returns from increases in 
patents and R&D spending is market compensation for systematic risk. In an 
intertemporal economy, the changes in technology prospects may affect consumption and 
investment opportunities, and lead to systematic technology risk in asset pricing. Merton 
(1973) posits that any economic variable related to future investment opportunities may 
act as a risk factor in determining expected asset returns. Given the fact that many 
investment opportunities are driven by new technologies, we would expect to see a risk 
factor representing the effect of technology uncertainty on asset returns as a result of firm 
patents and R&D spending. The results in Table 2.6 show that the patent factor 
(PATFACT) is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level. However, the R&D 
factor (RDFACT) shows a negative correlation with excess returns.  
2.4.2.5 Contrast between patents and R&D as adverse selection risk. 
The combination of the three hypotheses suggests that firm-level decisions that will lead 
to an increase in private information must be priced one-sided, but decisions that will 
reduce private information are not. This is a modification of what Aboody and Lev 
(2000) proposed. They argue that all corporate investments create information 
                                                 
17 The patent (R&D) factor is estimated by shorting assets with low patents (R&D) and longing assets with 
high patents (R&D). 
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asymmetry. Firms’ investments in R&D and patents are two examples of corporate 
investments. The main focus of this chapter is to specifically discuss and contrast the two 
corporate investment variables, patents and R&D. Though in Table 2.4 patents 
(PATLEV) and R&D (RDMAT) are both significantly related to the estimate of the 
asymmetric information variable )1( 2iR− , the characteristic test suggests they may be 
priced differently. The asymmetric information test may suggest similarities in the 
information structure of patents and R&D spending since they both correlate 
with )1( 2iR− . However, when the analysis controls for volume (VOL
18
)1( 2iR−
) of stocks traded, 
patents and  becomes negatively related whiles RDMAT is still positive.  
According to the Daniel and Titman’s model, patents may be priced systematic 
and R&D priced characteristic. Patents and R&D factors are estimated based on the zero-
cost investment portfolio return methodology. PATFACT and RDFACT are returns on 
equal-weighted, zero-cost, factor-mimicking portfolios for patents and R&D. According 
to the Merton’s framework, anything that changes the investment opportunities of a firm 
may be priced systematic. PATFACT and RDFACT may proxy for systematic changes in 
technology, which changes investment opportunities. The cross-sectional regression 
results in Table 2.6 show that RDMAT is significantly related to returns, while RDFACT 
is not. However, in the case of patents, PATFACT is significant while PATLEV is not. 
These results provide evidence that adverse selection risk due to R&D investments 
support the characteristics perspective. However, instead of this coming from a 
behavioral view, it is here fully consistent with rational behavior by all investors. The 
patent variable on the other hand, works better as a proxy for systematic risk than as firm-
level adverse selection risk.  
 
2.5 Robustness  
A number of robustness checks are conducted to test whether minor changes in the 
underlying assumption may affect the stated hypotheses. The first hypothesis proposes 
that patents and R&D activities generate adverse selection risk, and investors are 
                                                 
18 Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) noted that there is substantial interest in the role of volume in 
explaining asset-price behavior. It is important to control for the possibility of PATLEV and RDMAT 
being proxied by the effect of volume in the results. 
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rewarded with higher average returns for holding such stocks. Thus, patents and R&D 
activities must generate increased private information, and this is priced by the market. 
First, I check the robustness of the asymmetric information test of patents and R&D 
variables. In this robustness check, instead of running a time series regression of 
individual firms to estimate the r-squares and betas, I run the time series regression of the 
25 portfolios. Each firm is then assigned the r-square and beta of their corresponding 
portfolios. 
Results presented in Table 2.7 show that RDMAT is positive and significantly 
related to the asymmetric information variable. However, PATLEV is not related to the 
asymmetric information variable. In the main results it was realized that the private 
information generated by patents may proxy for volume, since controlling for volume 
made patent insignificant. The results here suggest that small changes in the estimation of 
r-squares and market betas do not significantly change the outcome. The robustness 
analysis confirms that R&D investments may proxy for increased private information due 
to increased adverse selection risk.  
The next hypothesized issue is whether the adverse selection risk is priced. Based 
on Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002)’s approach, I form 25 value-weighted portfolios 
sorted by book-to-market and size. Thus in place of the equally-weighted, value-weighted 
portfolios are used to run the time series regression to estimate the market betas. The 
analysis discussed in sub-section ii is re-run with the estimated betas from the time series 
regression using value-weighted instead of equally-weighted portfolios.  The results19
The second hypothesis proposes that the adverse selection risk due to patents and 
R&D activities are priced-characteristic. This is tested by performing the characteristic 
test described in Daniel and Titman (1997).  The robustness of these results is tested by 
making minor variations in the sample data. A sub-sample of three CRSP two-digit sic 
code of high R&D intensive industries and low R&D intensive industries are used. The 
 are 
consistent with that of the equal weighted portfolio formation. I also use equally weighted 
portfolios instead of individual firms to test the time varying effects of PATLEV and 
RDMAT on mean returns. The result is reported in Table 8, and it shows that RDMAT is 
significant while PATLEV is not. 
                                                 
19  Results are not included but are available upon request 
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three high R&D intensive portfolios are formed by sorting firms on the basis of two-digit 
SIC codes. The selected industries are SIC codes 28, 35, and 36. The selection of high 
R&D intensive industries is based on Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001)20
Table 2.9 presents characteristic test results of patent variables (PATLEV and 
PATFACT) for high and low R&D intensive industries. On average, for low R&D 
intensive industry, both PATFACT and PATLEV are not significantly related to mean 
returns. In the high R&D segment, both PATLEV and PATFACT are on average 
significant and positive. PATFACT is significant at the 95% confidence level, while 
PATLEV is significant at the 90% confidence level. Table 2.10 present the characteristic 
test results of the R&D variables (RDMAT and RDFACT) for high and low R&D 
intensive industries. For the low R&D intensive, on average RDMAT is positively related 
to mean returns but this is not significant. However, RDFACT is negatively related and 
significant at the 99% confidence level. In the case of high R&D intensive industries, 
RDMAT is significant at the 95% while RDFACT is not significant. If the momentum 
factor is included in the explanatory variables, RDMAT’s significance level increases 
from 95% to 99%. Daniel and Titman’s characteristic test proposes that firm-specific 
characteristics must perform better than market systematic factor. The results in Table 
2.10 and 2.11 provide evidence in support of R&D activities being priced as firm-specific 
adverse selection risk.  
, but I 
limit the criteria to two-digit SIC code industries in this robustness analysis. Another 
three low R&D intensive industries are selected based on the following criteria: 1. 
Industries should be in the manufacturing category, 2. Industries should have R&D 
expenditure at all data points and 3. Industries should closely match the high R&D 
intensive industries. The selection of the low R&D intensive classification is such that 
they would be comparable to the high R&D intensive industries. 
I also use RDCAP1 21
                                                 
20 In Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001), they use a combination of three-digit and two-digit sic-code 
industries. 
 in place of RDMAT for robustness check. This tests 
whether minor changes in the estimation of key variable would affect the outcome of the 
hypothesis, but the hypotheses listed in the chapter continues to hold. 
21 RDCAP1 is the capitalized R&D variable formulated based on Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001), 
where the ratios are expressed as R&D to Total Asset.  
 27 
2.6 Conclusion  
The analysis in this chapter addresses three main issues related to firm patents and R&D 
activities. These questions could be restated as “Do patents and R&D spending represent 
adverse selection risk and are they priced as characteristic or systematic risk?” The first 
part of the question addresses the linkages between patents and R&D, and adverse 
selection risk. The evidence presented shows that R&D activities generate uncertain 
benefits that increase private information. More private information imposes adverse 
selection risk on investors and the market compensates these investors with higher mean 
returns. Similarly, patents also generate uncertain benefits that increase private 
information and this is compensated for with higher mean returns. An underlying issue 
investigated in the chapter is whether the two key variables share the same information 
structure. The introduction of the two variables jointly in the empirical model show that 
the impact of patents diminishes. The empirical relation between patents and equity 
returns becomes negative, while the R&D variable continues to be significant with 
reduced economic impact. Thus R&D may be riskier before the introduction of patents 
and the effect of patents reduces the private information in a firm’s R&D spending. This 
may provide an indication of differences in the information structure of patents and R&D 
spending.   
The second part of the research question explores the contrast in the information 
structure of patents and R&D further. I show that the compensation for risk associated 
with increased R&D activities is firm-specific and different from market-determined 
systematic risk. This is in line with Daniel and Titman’s (1997) and Jagannathan and 
Wang’s (1998) “characteristics” argument. The evidence supports a modified 
characteristics perspective, because instead of it coming from a behavioral view, it is 
fully consistent with rational behavior by all investors. The evidence in support of firm-
specific characteristic risk for patents is very weak. There is stronger evidence of 
systematic priced risk for patents. Thus patents may proxy for higher sensitivity to 
aggregate technology growth which is a Merton factor. This may enforce the argument on 
the differences in the information structure of patents and R&D spending. These 
differences could be explained by the requirement by USPTO for assignees to disclose all 
patent information. There is however no such requirement for firms to disclose 
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information about specific R&D spending and stages of development of R&D activities. 
The differences in the information structure may also be explained in terms of differences 
in the economic nature of the two variables. R&D is an investment input while patents 
may be viewed as an investment output. 
The findings in this chapter lend support to the body of literature on asset pricing 
that argues in favor of one-sided (adverse selection) risk priced in the market. Thus as 
firms increase their R&D activities, insiders with private information can take advantage 
at the expense of outsiders who only have public information. For the market to attract 
outsiders to trade in the firm’s stock, it must offer higher returns in excess of the 
systematic risk-return tradeoff. As R&D activities increase, stocks offer higher mean 
returns due to asymmetric information risk.  This chapter complements the existing 
literature on information-based trading risk that calls for a rethinking of asset pricing 
models. The results support the notion that not all idiosyncratic risks are diversified away 
through portfolio formation.  
The evidence presented in the chapter accepts the hypothesis that a higher level of 
patent and R&D spending raises average returns. The increase in average returns 
associated with R&D spending is due to characteristic risk and that of patents is due to 
systematic risk. 
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Summary Results of Portfolios 
Table 2.1 
 
From 1970.01 to 2001.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of 
firm size. Within each size portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted into 5 book-to-market quintiles. The 
size of a firm is measured by the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at 
the end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-
to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) at time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of 
year t-1 by market equity (ME) at December of year t-1. The book-to-market equity ratios at time t are 
matched by the stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. SIZE is the size of a firm and it is 
measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the end of June 
of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity 
ratio (BE/ME) at time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market 
equity (ME) at December of year t-1. PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each 
firm in a month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure of 
a firm to the Total Assets. The excess returns are CRSP monthly returns. Compustat annual data is merged 
with CRSP to generate monthly frequency for the sample data.  
 
 
 
 Mean            
 Excess Return  SIZE    Std. Dev    
  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
BM Low -0.0083 -0.0055 0.0014 0.0569 0.0873  1.1290 1.1191 1.0516 0.9296 0.8265 
 2 -0.0672 0.0352 0.0726 0.1081 0.1230  1.1959 1.0272 0.9370 0.8405 0.7873 
 3 0.0047 0.0925 0.1273 0.1575 0.1581  1.1152 0.9883 0.9496 0.9028 0.8847 
 4 0.0679 0.1334 0.1632 0.1928 0.1845  1.0396 1.0591 1.0238 0.9743 0.8973 
 High 0.1700 0.1956 0.2452 0.2793 0.2516  1.2319 1.1749 1.1190 1.2011 0.9145 
             
 PATLEV            
 Low 0.081 0.064 0.071 0.094 0.096  0.5645 0.5596 0.5258 0.4648 0.4133 
 2 0.128 0.162 0.110 0.089 0.181  0.5980 0.5136 0.4685 0.4203 0.3937 
 3 0.159 0.147 0.085 0.075 0.106  0.5576 0.4942 0.4748 0.4514 0.4424 
 4 0.111 0.046 0.040 0.048 0.033  0.5198 0.5296 0.5119 0.4872 0.4487 
 High 0.834 0.823 0.798 0.279 0.022  0.6160 0.5875 0.5595 0.6006 0.4573 
             
 R&D Capital            
 Low 0.033 0.025 0.038 0.046 0.085  0.0677 0.0516 0.0869 0.0864 0.1101 
 2 0.022 0.027 0.033 0.033 0.067  0.0571 0.0507 0.0641 0.0624 0.0904 
 3 0.024 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.046  0.0463 0.0729 0.0479 0.0574 0.0721 
 4 0.030 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.024  0.0629 0.0436 0.0393 0.0526 0.0528 
 High 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.029 0.024  0.0497 0.0496 0.0558 0.0602 0.0589 
             
 RDMAT            
 Low 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.015 0.030  0.3305 0.2149 0.3850 0.3230 0.3997 
 2 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.023  0.2213 0.1914 0.2253 0.2671 0.3168 
 3 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.015  0.2348 0.2091 0.1661 0.1986 0.2463 
 4 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008  0.2091 0.1200 0.1268 0.1791 0.1764 
 High 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008  0.1695 0.1643 0.1971 0.2207 0.2122 
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Portfolio Returns 
Table 2.2 
 
Table 2 contains summary results for portfolio of stocks sorted by size and the patent variable and also size 
and the R&D variable. Size is measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price 
of the stock at the end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding.  PATLEV is the ratio of the 
number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in a month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. 
RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure of a firm to the Total Assets. Panel A reports average returns of 
portfolios sorted by size and PATLEV. Panel B reports average returns of portfolio sorted by size and 
within size sorted by RDMAT. Panel C reports average number of stocks in each portfolio for 
SIZE/PATLEV. Panel D reports average number of stocks in each portfolio for SIZE/RDMAT. The sample 
used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of 
the data is from 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
 
 
 
 
 
SIZE/PATLEV Low High   SIZE/RDMAT Low Medium High 
Panel A:    Panel B:    
 Average returns    Average return  
Small 0.073 0.107  Small 0.039 -0.020 0.159 
2 0.115 0.121  2 0.084 0.116 -0.008 
3 0.169 0.200  3 0.121 0.144 0.161 
4 0.402 0.521  4 0.463 0.572 0.455 
Large 1.017 1.123  Large 1.103 0.873 1.185 
 
 
 
SIZE/PATLEV Low High   SIZE/RDMAT Low Medium High 
Panel C    Panel D    
 Number of stocks   Number of stocks  
Small 34.77 35.49  Small 32.50 31.78 33.05 
2 38.12 40.94  2 33.82 35.60 34.98 
3 43.35 48.16  3 36.51 37.17 37.75 
4 54.35 63.26  4 42.95 44.44 43.96 
Large 121.42 212.41  Large 111.01 108.45 170.28 
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Summary Statistics 
Table 2.3 
 
Table is summary statistics of key variables used in the study. The sample used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT 
data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the data is from 1970:01 – 
2001:12. RET is the monthly return data from CRSP returns and RDMAT is the R&D spending of firms 
divided by Total Assets. PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in a 
month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. SIZE is the size of a firm and it is measured as the 
log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the end of June of year t times the 
total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) at 
time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market equity (ME) at 
December of year t-1.   VOL is the volume of stocks traded in a month. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
RET 0.0164 0.155 -0.8476 12.5 
RDMAT 0.0124 0.026 0 0.5426 
PATLEV 0.0419 3.669 0 0.8251 
BM 4.5764 3.218 0.1565 134.13 
SIZE 2.8574 1.953 1.2376 3.5952 
VOL 4.4365 2.648 0 7.4133 
 
 
Correlation Matrix of Key Independent Variables 
Panel B 
 
 
 
RDMAT 1.000     
PATLEV 0.621 1.000   
VOL 0.418 0.618 1.000 
  RDMAT PATLEV VOL 
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Cross-sectional Test of Asymmetric Information versus Patent and R&D 
Table 2.4 
 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual 
firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, asymmetric 
information variable defined as INF = )1( 2R− .  is regressed cross-sectionally against PATLEV, and 
RDMAT, and the results are averaged across time. iR 2  is the estimated r-square from the first pass 
regression.  PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in a month, where 
the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure of a firm to the Total 
Assets. VOL is the log of the volume of stocks of a firm traded in a month. The sample used is CRSP/ 
CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the data is from 
1970:01 – 2001:12. 
 
 
 
Panel A RDMAT     RSQ 
 0.15306   0.3329 
 (98.33)***    
B PATLEV       
 0.013   0.3106 
 (4.39)***    
C RDMAT VOL   RSQ 
 0.11476 0.0023  0.4143 
 (140.06)*** (14.129)***   
D PATLEV VOL   RSQ 
 0.00619 0.0033  0.2813 
 (18.52)*** (15.22)***   
E PATLEV RDMAT    RSQ 
 0.00183 0.1114  0.3917 
 (10.19)*** (21.86)***   
F PATLEV RDMAT VOL RSQ 
 -0.0013 0.1181 0.0018 0.458 
  (-6.84)*** (91.73)*** (13.51)***   
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Cross-sectional Regression of Excess Returns of Individual Firm 
Table 2.5 
 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual 
firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, individual stocks’ 
expected excess returns are regressed on factor betas from the first pass and the characteristic variable. 
PATLEV and RDMAT are the characteristic variables used in the analysis. EXRET is the CRSP monthly 
returns minus risk free rate, BETA is the estimated market factor from the first pass. SIZE is the size of a 
firm and it is measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the 
end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-
market equity ratio (BE/ME) at time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of 
year t-1 by market equity (ME) at December of year t-1.  PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to 
Total Assets for each firm in a month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. RDMAT is the ratio of 
R&D expenditure of a firm to the Total Assets. RSQ is the estimate r-square from the cross-sectional 
regression. The sample used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall 
website, and the period of the data is from 1970:01 – 2001:12 Results is based on the model; 
iiiii
mkt
ii RDMATBMSIZERFR ηγγγβγγ +++++=− 43210 ˆ  
 
 
 
EXRET CONSTANT BETA PATLEV RDMAT SIZE BM RSQ 
Model 1 1.082 1.037 0.042  0.0057 0.0049 0.356 
 (2.59)** (4.16)*** (1.84)*  (2.57)** (0.258)  
Model 2 1.116 1.391  0.1985 0.0052 0.006 0.296 
 (2.18)** (2.74)**  (3.09)*** (2.07)** (0.065)  
Model 3 1.064 1.16 -0.0043 0.167 0.0022 0.0041 0.453 
  (1.88)* (3.18)*** (-1.13) (3.17)*** (1.85)* (0.543)   
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Characteristic Test using all data in sample 
Table 2.6 
 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual 
firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, individual stocks’ 
expected excess returns are regressed on factor betas from the first pass and characteristic variable. 
PATLEV and RDMAT are the characteristic variables used in the analysis. The sample used is CRSP/ 
CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the data is from 
1970:01 – 2001. The test is based on Daniel and Titman’s characteristic model, where model 1 and 2 
present the results comparing patent factor with patent levels and model 3 and 4 compare the results of the 
R&D factor and R&D intensity.  BETA is the estimated market beta from the 1st pass, SIZE is the size of a 
firm and it is measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the 
end of June of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-
market equity ratio (BE/ME) at time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of 
year t-1 by market equity (ME) at December of year t-1. EXRET is CRSP monthly returns minus risk free 
rate and RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure to Total Assets. RDFACT is a R&D factor variable 
estimated by shorting assets with low R&D expenditure and long assets with high R&D expenditure. 
PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in a month, where the Total 
Asset is scaled by a millionth. PATFACT is a patent factor variable estimated by shorting assets with low 
patent issues and long assets with high patent issue. According to Daniel and Titman (1997), if an asset is 
priced characteristic, then the characteristic variable must perform better than the factor variable in a cross-
sectional regression of with both variables.  The sample used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with 
patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the data is from 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
 
 
 
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM PATFACT PATLEV RSQ 
Model 1 0.013 1.041 0.219 0.361 0.071 0.138 0.357 
 (2.88)** (5.17)*** (11.56)*** (15.45)*** (2.81)** (1.105)  
        
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM RDFACT RDMAT RSQ 
Model 2 0.053 1.042 0.392 0.336 -0.044 0.0234 0.346 
  (3.84)*** (6.07)*** (14.73)*** (13.32)*** (-1.74)* ((2.66)**   
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Robustness: Test of Individual Firm Patent and R&D and Asymmetric Information 
Table 2.7 
 
From 1970.01 to 2001.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of 
firm size. Within each size portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted into 5 book-to-market quintiles. In the 
first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. 2R is the estimated r-square 
from time series regression of 25 the portfolios and it is used to estimate the asymmetric information 
variable INF = )1( 2R− . Individual firms are assigned the betas from the first pass and these are used to test 
whether PATLEV and RDMAT correlate with )1( 2R− . PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to 
Total Assets for each firm in a month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. RDMAT is the ratio of 
R&D expenditure of a firm to the Total Assets. SIZE is the size of a firm and it is measured as the log of 
market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the end of June of year t times the total 
shares outstanding. The sample used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn 
Hall website, and the period of the data is from 1970:01 – 2001 
ititititiiit PATLEVcSIZEcBETAbaINF ε++++= 21 ., where )1( 2RINF −=  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INF CONSTANT BETA PATLEV SIZE PATLEV/SIZE RSQ 
 1.0127 -0.5265 0.00182 -0.042 -0.031 0.7195 
 (42.19)*** (-18.2165)*** (1.041) (-32.427)*** (-1.018)  
       
INF CONSTANT BETA RDMAT SIZE RDMAT/SIZE RSQ 
 1.19245 -0.41889 43.912 -0.04799 -1.7032 0.8012 
  (49.292)*** (-19.1759)*** (1.9644)* (-17.596)*** (-2.16)**   
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Robustness: Time Series Regression Results of 25 Portfolios 
Table 2.8 
 
From 1970.01 to 2001.12, at the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios on the basis of 
firm size. Within each size portfolios, stocks are subsequently sorted into 5 book-to-market quintiles. The 
excess portfolio returns are regressed against excess market, Fama-French size and value factors. PATLEV 
is the ratio of the average number of patents to Total Assets for each portfolio in a month, where the Total 
Asset is scaled by a millionth. and PATGW is a measure of patent shock estimated by the percentage 
deviation of patent from 6 month moving average. RDMAT measures the ratio of R&D expenditure of firms 
to the total assets. The sample used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn 
Hall website, and the period of the data is from 1970:01 – 2001 
 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
CONSTANT 0.016 0.012 -0.032 -0.04 -0.051 -0.04 0.4623 
 (2.16)** (2.17)** (-0.65) (-0.83) (-1.06) (-0.80) (13.97)*** 
EX-MARKET 0.981 0.913 0.956 0.9564 0.956 0.957 0.916 
 (185.30)*** (187.40)*** (185.50)*** (184.86)*** (183.65)*** (182.45)*** (189.95)*** 
SMB 0.414 0.428 0.505 0.505 0.506 0.504  
 (25.15)*** (29.26)*** (34.26)*** (34.10)*** (34.32)*** (34.39)***  
HML 0.382 0.385 0.4321 0.432 0.432 0.431  
 (30.18)*** (31.27)*** (38.21)*** (38.15)*** (38.05)*** (38.04)***  
PATLEV -0.215 0.021    -0.295 -4.492 
 (-1.13) (0.90)    (-0.52) (-2.43)** 
RDMAT -  0.075 0.095 0.126 0.224  
 -  (4.012)*** (3.73)*** (1.82)* (2.10)**  
PATGW 0.004 - - 0.003 -0.0002 -0.012 -0.026 
 (0.35) - - (0.20) (-0.015) (-0.907) (-1.18) 
        
R2 adjusted 0.718 0.682 0.742 0.7423 0.7425 0.7425 0.6355 
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Robustness: Characteristic Test of patent variable and parent factor using selected 
industry portfolios 
Table 2.9 
 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual 
firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, individual stocks’ 
expected excess returns are regressed on factor betas from the first pass and characteristic variable. 
PATLEV and RDMAT are the characteristic variables used in the analysis. The sample used is CRSP/ 
CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the data is from 
1970:01 – 2001. The test is based on Daniel and Titman’s characteristic model, where model 1 and 2 
present the results comparing patent factor with patent levels and model 3 and 4 compare the results of the 
R&D factor and R&D intensity.  BETA is the market beta factor, SIZE is the size of a firm and it is 
measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the end of June 
of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity 
ratio (BM) at time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market 
equity (ME) at December of year t-1. EXRET is CRSP monthly returns minus risk free rate and PATLEV is 
the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for each firm in a month, where the Total Asset is scaled 
by a millionth. PATFACT is a patent factor variable estimated by shorting assets with low patent issues and 
long assets with high patent issue. According to Daniel and Titman (1997), if an asset is priced 
characteristic, then the characteristic variable must perform better than the factor variable in a cross-
sectional regression of with both variables.  The sample of two-digit sic code (20, 24, 28, 33, 35, 36) used 
is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the 
data is from 1970:01 – 2001:12. The sample is made up of firm in high R&D intensive industry (20, 24, 33) 
and low R&D intensive industry (28, 35,36). 
 
 
 
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM PATFACT PATLEV RSQ 
SIC 20 0.123 0.859 -0.015 0.052 -0.016 0.143 0.571 
 (2.16)** (21.16)*** (-3.21)*** (0.86) (-4.09)*** (2.54)**  
SIC 24 0.102 1.108 0.075 0.296 -0.0077 -0.183 0.582 
 (2.29)** (22.33)*** (0.94) (3.01)*** (-0.12) (-0.8)  
SIC 33 0.117 1.024 0.052 0.199 0.7239 -0.061 0.697 
 (2.22)** (20.74)*** (9.92)*** (8.59)*** (7.1)*** (-0.48)  
AVERAGE 0.114 0.997 0.037 0.182 0.233 -0.034 0.617 
  (18.26)*** (13.63)*** (1.38) (2.57)** (0.95) (-0.35)   
        
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM PATFACT PATLEV RSQ 
SIC 28 0.153 0.935 0.124 0.164 0.062 0.047 0.803 
 (2.41)** (34.66)*** (2.99)** (3.75)*** (0.94) (2.29)**  
SIC 35 0.165 1.039 0.574 0.397 0.294 -0.001 0.827 
 (2.32)** (34.61)*** (3.43)*** (8.22)*** (5.52)*** (-0.07)  
SIC 36 0.174 1.059 0.640 0.211 0.531 0.075 0.874 
 (2.58)** (38.37)*** (4.99)*** (4.75)*** (9.67)*** (3.94)***  
AVERAGE 0.146 1.011 0.446 0.257 0.296 0.040 0.834 
  (26.96)*** (26.30)*** (2.75)** (3.62)*** (2.18)** (1.82)*   
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Robustness: Characteristic Test of R&D variable and R&D factor using selected 
industry portfolios 
Table 2.10 
 
In the first pass, portfolio excess returns are regressed on market, SMB and HML factors. Each individual 
firm is assigned with betas of the portfolio that the firm belongs to. In the second pass, individual stocks’ 
expected excess returns are regressed on factor betas from the first pass and characteristic variable. 
PATLEV and RDMAT are the characteristic variables used in the analysis. The sample used is CRSP/ 
CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall website, and the period of the data is from 
1970:01 – 2001. The test is based on Daniel and Titman’s characteristic model, where model 1 and 2 
present the results comparing patent factor with patent levels and model 3 and 4 compare the results of the 
R&D factor and R&D intensity.  BETA is the market beta factor, SIZE is the size of a firm and it is 
measured as the log of market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the end of June 
of year t times the total shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity 
ratio (BM) at time t is calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market 
equity (ME) at December of year t-1. EXRET is CRSP monthly returns minus risk free rate and RDMAT is 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to Total Assets. RDFACT is a R&D factor variable estimated by shorting 
assets with low R&D expenditure and long assets with high R&D expenditure. According to Daniel and 
Titman (1997), if an asset is priced characteristic, then the characteristic variable must perform better than 
the factor variable in a cross-sectional regression of with both variables.  The sample of two-digit sic code 
(20, 24, 28, 33, 35, 36) used is CRSP/ CUMPUSTAT data merged with patent data from Bronwyn Hall 
website, and the period of the data is from 1970:01 – 2001:12. The sample is made up of firm in high R&D 
intensive industry (20, 24, 33) and low R&D intensive industry (28, 35,36). 
 
 
 
 
EXRET  CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM RDFACT RDMAT RSQ 
SIC 20 0.103 0.759 -0.100 0.092 -0.138 0.496 0.5591 
 (2.11)** (20.13)*** (-1.96)* (1.48) (-2.44)** (2.57)**  
SIC 24 0.112 1.309 0.033 0.186 -0.258 0.040 0.5906 
 (2.24)** (21.94)*** (0.40) (1.90)* (-2.84)** (0.13)  
SIC 33 0.101 1.084 0.379 0.364 -0.095 -0.025 0.6596 
 (2.31)** (24.01)*** (6.19)*** (4.91)*** (-1.40) (-0.26)  
AVERAGE 0.105 1.051 0.104 0.214 -0.164 0.170 0.6031 
  (31.14)*** (6.58)*** (0.73) (2.68)** (-3.36)*** (1.04)   
        
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM RDFACT RDMAT RSQ 
SIC 28 0.111 0.937 0.095 0.126 -0.046 0.076 0.804 
 (2.51)*** (35.28)*** (2.63)** (2.88)** (-1.14) (2.71)**  
SIC 35 0.105 1.068 0.427 0.272 -0.036 0.018 0.8129 
 (2.34)*** (34.73)*** (10.24)*** (5.40)*** (-0.77) (0.44)  
SIC 36 0.120 1.102 0.481 0.183 0.341 0.081 0.8638 
 (2.41)*** (39.04)*** (12.59)*** (3.92)*** (7.99)*** (2.76)**  
AVERAGE 0.112 1.036 0.334 0.194 0.086 0.058 0.8269 
  (25.70)*** (20.57)*** (2.77)** (4.56)*** (0.68) (2.89)**   
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Robustness: Characteristic Test using individual firms in selected industry 
Table 2.11 
 
Table presents result of excess returns regressed against factors and firm level characteristics based on 
selected industry [sic (20, 24, 28, 33, 35, and 36)] data. The test is based on the Daniel and Titman 
characteristic test, where time series of individual firms in the selected sub-sample are run and averaged 
across firms. BETA is the market beta factor, SIZE is the size of a firm and it is measured as the log of 
market value of equity, which equals the stock price of the stock at the end of June of year t times the total 
shares outstanding. Following Fama and French (1992), the book-to-market equity ratio (BM) at time t is 
calculated by dividing book equity (BE) at the fiscal ending of year t-1 by market equity (ME) at December 
of year t-1. The dependent variable (EXRET) used in the first and second pass is the excess return of 
individual firms. RDMAT is the ratio of R&D expenditure to Total Assets of each firm within an industry 
portfolio. RDFACT is a R&D factor variable estimated by shorting assets with low R&D expenditure and 
long assets with high R&D expenditure. PATLEV is the ratio of the number of patents to Total Assets for 
each firm in a month, where the Total Asset is scaled by a millionth. PATFACT is a patent factor variable 
estimated by shorting assets with low patent issues and long assets with high patent issue. 
 
 
 
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM RDFACT RDMAT R-squared 
Model 1 0.015 1.028 0.313 0.277 0.0092 0.154 0.318 
 (1.71)* (45.41)*** (8.001)*** (7.622)*** (0.2746) (4.653)***  
        
EXRET CONSTANT BETA SIZE BM PATFACT PATLEV R-squared 
Model 2 0.021 0.982 0.308 0.365 0.107 -0.0073 0.307 
 (1.91)* (40.88)*** (6.80)*** (9.18)*** (2.79)** (-0.057)  
        
EXRET CONSTANT BETA BM RDFACT RDMAT   R-squared 
Model 3 0.024 1.042 0.296 -0.0176 0.106  0.305 
 (1.77)* (45.048)*** (8.01)*** (-0.509) (3.104)***   
        
EXRET CONSTANT BETA BM PATFACT PATLEV   R-squared 
Model 4 0.028 1.002 0.401 0.1082 -0.019  0.294 
  (2.01)** (41.54)*** (9.671)*** (2.94)** (-0.064)     
* 90% significance level       ** 95% significance level      *** 99% significance level 
Where t-values are in parenthesis 
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Chapter 3. Return Predictability Using Firm-Issued Patents 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Shiller (1987, 1991) provides survey evidence to show that investors sometimes react to 
each other rather than to economic facts. This accession may lead to investors over-
reacting or under-reacting to information in the financial market. DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985, 1987) use contrarian strategies, where firms are sorted based on previous 
performance by shorting winners and holding losers, to generate positive excess returns. 
The intuition behind the contrarian view suggests initial high stock prices due to over-
reaction by investors and subsequent downward price correction over time. Thus prices 
revert to its trend level after previous overreaction.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) provide evidence to show that momentum 
strategies, the exact opposite of the contrarian strategies also generate positive returns. 
The momentum strategies hold winners and short losers over a holding period. The 
positive abnormal returns from the momentum strategies are explained by the under-
reaction hypothesis.  Thus the market may react partially to information and later 
experience upward correction as information becomes more widely available. This is also 
supported by the behavioral hypothesis, since according to Shiller investors react to what 
others are doing more than what economic facts dictate. This creates the bandwagon 
effect, where people are inclined to bet on a winner. As more investors are attracted to 
winners, the effect of increased demand leads to further upward movement in prices, 
generating positive returns. 
Though the overreaction and underreaction hypotheses suggest a contradiction, 
Balvers and Wu (2006) argue that not only can the two generate positive returns, but they 
can co-exist in a single financial model to generate positive returns. They argue that the 
use of contrarian and momentum strategies does not present a contradiction since a 
contrarian considers a longer-term perspective and momentum looks at a short-term 
perspective. In this chapter, I investigate the use of firm-issued patents in trading 
strategies that generate momentum-like abnormal returns. The intuition behind the 
abnormal returns stems from investors’ evaluation of the growth prospect of the firms as 
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new information about firms’ patents becomes available. Increases in firm-issued patents 
may generate more noise, especially for the uninformed investors, since they may not be 
able to accurately judge the value of firm-issued patents. Overall, market may under-react 
to the new information about patents leading to future market correct. I use the non-
parametric model discussed in Jagadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) to create 10 decile 
portfolios sorted by firm-level patents.  
This chapter is an extension of the previous chapter [chapter 222
 A number of papers explain the momentum profit as compensation for some form 
of systematic risk. Berk, Green and Naik (1999) demonstrate that the slow turnover in 
], where the focus 
was to investigate whether patents and R&D generate firm-specific adverse selection risk, 
and whether such risks are priced. Evidence in the chapter does not provide a conclusive 
answer to whether patents generate a “characteristics” effect due to market reaction to 
information. This chapter provides an alternative approach to evaluate the information 
content of firm patents and how it impacts on returns. I show that trading strategies that 
short stocks with low issued patents and hold stocks with high issued patent generate 
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns from such trading strategies may very well be 
explained by a patent risk factor or some underlying risk factor like R&D risk. The 
apparent abnormal returns may be generated if return realizations correlate with risk 
sensitivities due to increases in firm-issued patents or R&D activities. As noted in 
Balvers and Wu (2006), when a persistent increase in systematic risk comes about, 
returns are initially low as prices adjust but subsequently are higher as expected returns 
have increased due to the increased reward for risk. The evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that the abnormal returns associated with selecting stocks on the basis of 
their patents may be explained by noise generated by firm patent activities. And such 
increased noise may be due to investors’ under-reaction to patent information and 
subsequent correction over time. I also provide evidence to show that the momentum 
profit could be explained by a patent risk factor in a four-factor Fama-French model. The 
introduction of a patent risk factor reduces the alpha, the abnormal return from the 
momentum strategy, by half. The “winner” momentum portfolio tends to have higher 
issued patents and the “loser” portfolio tends to have relatively lower issued patents. 
                                                 
22 The first paper in my dissertation; ‘do Patents or R&D Represent Adverse Selection Risk?’ 
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firms’ projects gives rise to persistence in their systematic risk, making expected returns 
positively correlated with lagged expected returns. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
suggest that momentum profits may not come from firm-specific returns, but from 
different sensitivities of stocks to the time-varying macroeconomic variables. This 
chapter addresses the issue by investigating any link patent portfolios may have with 
systematic risk. Thus are high patent portfolios systematically selecting high risk stock? 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggest that using a trading strategy that select 
stocks based on firm issued patents generate abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are 
not an obvious proxy for systematic risk. The explanation for the results may be due to 
future market correction for noise generated by firm-issued patents.  
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the literature 
and proposes the hypothesis of study in the chapter. Section 3 describes the empirical 
model used in the analysis. Section 4 provides information about the source of data. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 presents the robustness analysis and 
Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 The Literature and Hypothesis 
Recent papers by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and a host of others have showed 
that stock selection strategies may generate positive excess returns. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) show that stocks that perform best in prior periods tend to continue to perform 
well for subsequent periods.  The momentum strategies described in their paper short 
stocks of previous losers and hold stocks of previous winners. The momentum strategy is 
supported by the behavioral and psychological hypothesis. Thus individuals (investors) 
see the price of a stock rising and are drawn to invest in it believing that price would rise 
further. This creates a bandwagon effect as more investors are drawn to invest in the 
stock and that further raises stock returns. The paper builds on the behavioral hypothesis 
of Hong and Stein (1999). 
Stein (1987) observes that imperfectly informed rational speculators introduce 
noise as well as information into asset prices, and can make prices carry less information 
about the state of the economy and be less stable. Stein’s idea as encapsulated in the 
behavioral hypothesis could be applicable to firm-issued patents. I hypothesize that an 
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unexpected jump in firm-issued patents may present new information to the market and 
because some investors are imperfectly informed their reaction may introduce noise as 
noted by Stein (1987).  
Hypothesis 1: 
Imperfectly informed investors react partially to unexpected increases in 
firm-issued patents. An initial increase in returns is followed by a further 
increase in a future time period as noise subsides. 
 
The research question addresses the characteristic properties of a firm’s unexpected 
increase in issued patents as an information variable in affecting stock returns.  Thus an 
unexpected jump in firm patents generates a behavioral reaction from the market, as 
explained by Stein (1987). It takes time for the market to fully learn all information, so 
price reaction to new information may be under-stated and subsequent correction would 
lead to upward movement in price. The market may not initially fully price issued 
patents, leading to upward market correction over time. Hence, one may get positive 
returns for using a trading strategy based on firm-issued patents. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
A firm’s patent exposure may be priced as systematic risk under the 
Merton asset pricing framework. 
 
Firm-issued patents may have a systematic risk explanation on the basis of the Merton’s 
framework. According to Merton (1973), anything that changes investment opportunities 
of firms may be priced. A patent factor may capture aggregate productivity changes that 
are systematic and the positive returns from patent trading strategies may be priced 
systematic risk. Higher betas on the patent factor would imply that higher patent firms 
have more exposure to this particular risk.  
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The level of patent exposure in portfolios of firms explains the documented 
momentum returns. 
 49 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) present evidence to show that trading strategy that uses the 
momentum strategy may generate abnormal returns. They argue that the standard risk 
adjustment could not explain the momentum profit. The third hypothesis evaluates 
whether patent exposure is responsible for the perceived momentum returns.  
The use of patent data in economic analysis dates back to Schmookler (1966) and 
Griliches (1984). Schmookler (1966) points out that historical patent data may reflect 
economically significant information about technological development. Griliches (1984) 
shows a positive relation between a firm’s market value and its patents. Pakes (1985) 
provides a focus study on the impact of patent and R&D shocks on equity returns using 
firm level data over a period of 8 years. Though limited in scope, he finds results to 
suggest that patent shocks significantly affect equity prices. 
Firm-issued patents have not been studied from the point of view of affecting the 
information structure of firms. Chapter 2 of the dissertation investigates patent data as a 
source of new information coming into the market, and how such firm-level characteristic 
effects are priced in the market. This chapter uses the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
methodology to investigate firm-issued patents as an information variable on stock 
returns. News of firm-issued patents may signal expected future growth prospects for the 
firm. The information may be viewed as positive news and stock price would react as 
such. Hence the market reacts to unexpected news of any new issued patent. I also 
include a patent citation variable in the analysis. Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1987) point 
out that patent may face limitations in capturing heterogeneity in economic data. 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) instead use patent renewal data, while Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2003), use patent citation data. The use of patent citations introduces a way 
to evaluate heterogeneity in the value of patents. Citations may therefore convey 
economically significant information and may provide an indication of how valuable a 
firm’s patent is. Trajtenberg (1990) investigates the economic significance of citations in 
a study of the flow of patents in the computed tomography (CT) scanner to the estimated 
social surplus due to improvement in technology. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) use 
citations as a proxy for patent quality. To address these concerns, I use patent citations as 
a robustness check.  
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3.3 Model  
Two models of performance measurement are used. The first is the Sharpe-Lintner 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the second is the Fama-French 4-factor model. 
The models are briefly described in this section, and the performance of their estimates 
on portfolios evaluated using New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (Amex) and Nasdaq stocks. The performance of the Fama and French (1993) 
3-factor model is also used for comparative purposes. 
 The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM builds on the model of portfolio choice developed by 
Markowitz (1959). Markowitz’s model assumes that an investor selects a portfolio at 
time 1−t that produces a stochastic return at time t . The model assumes that investors are 
risk averse and in their choice of portfolio, they care about the mean and variance of their 
one-period investment return. The algebraic expression for the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
using mean returns from strategies that sort stocks into portfolios based on firm issued 
patent is 
ifmifi rrrr εβ +−+= )(                                                                                   (3.1) 
2/),( mmii rrCov σβ =                                                                                          (3.2) 
ir is the expected returns of portfolio i , mr is the expected market returns, fr is the risk 
free rate and iβ is the market beta of an portfolio i . The empirical formulation of CAPM 
is given as 
itftmtiiftit rrrr εβα +−+=− )(                                                                          (3.3) 
Where iα is interpreted as the risk-adjusted mean excess returns of a portfolio i . 
A 4-factor model is constructed using the Fama-French 3-factor model and an additional 
factor capturing the patent anomaly23
ittititiftmtiiftit ePATFACTpHMLhSMBsrrrr ++++−+=− )(βα
. The 4-factor model is consistent with a model of 
market equilibrium with four risk factors. 
                (3.4) 
                                                 
23 This is motivated by the 3 factor model’s inability to explain cross-sectional variation in patent sorted 
portfolio returns. Carhart (1997) constructs momentum risk factor and use it to explain Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) momentum anomaly. 
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)( ftit rr − is the excess return of the 10 decile portfolios sorted by patents; fr is the risk-
free rate taken from Kenneth French’s data library; mr is the aggregate market return data 
from Kenneth French’s data library. SMB and HML are the size and value factors 
respectively from the Kenneth French data library. PATFACT  is the patent factor 
constructed as equal-weighted average returns of firms with the highest 30 percent 3-
month lagged patents minus the equal-weighted average returns of firms with the lowest 
30 percent 3-month lagged patents. iα , iβ , is , ih and ip  are model parameters and ie is 
the error term. iα and iβ  have their usual meaning as explained above. is  is the factor 
loading on the size factor, ih is the factor loading on the value factor and ip is the factor 
loading on the patent risk factor. 
The models described in equations 3.3 and 3.4, together with the Fama-French 3-
factor model is run to evaluate to what extent the abnormal profit is explained by known 
risk factors. Momentum portfolios and momentum factors are estimated and used to 
evaluate whether momentum profit is as a result of the portfolio systematically picking 
stocks with high patent risk.  
 
3.4 Data  
The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) publishes and keeps records of all US 
and Foreign patents obtained in the US. Patents are classified in three main categories as 
defined by the USPTO.24
                                                 
24 (1) Utility Patents;- thus for new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or  composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement. 
 Patent data may be freely downloaded from the USPTO 
website using the file extraction front end search or ftp folder downloads. However, 
working with USPTO data is tedious. Google also maintains a database on US patent, but 
bulk download for research purposes is challenging. In this chapter, I use patent data 
   (2) Design patents;- thus for invention of a new, original and ornamental design for an article of  
manufacture. 
   (3) Plant patents;- thus for the invention of or discovery and asexually reproduction of any distinct  and 
new variety of plant. 
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from the NBER and Bronwyn Hall’s website25
As indicated above, the patent data is taken from Hall’s data site and it spans the 
period 1969 – 2001. The patent data forms part of an on-going NBER project to link all 
patent assignee to COMPUSTAT cusip numbers. Hall et al. (2001) provide a description 
of the database on US patents. The selection of firms into the sample may have possible 
bias implications. For instance if a firm is in the sample and does not currently have a 
patent, then we know for sure that it will have a patent in the future, which at that point 
will cause a positive return shock. The rolling sample selection procedure is however 
used and it selects a firm only after it has received at least one patent.  
, and they provide a data file that links 
firm patents to COMPUSTAT gvkeys. 
A sample of firms for the study was constructed by merging patent data taken 
from Bronwyn Hall’s data library, the COMPUSTAT annual data file, and the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly data. From an initial list of 3,970 firms, a 
final list of about 691 firms is used. The sample of 691 firms is selected based on past 
patent information. The aggregate number of patents issued to a firm for the previous five 
years is used as the selection criteria to select a firm into the sample for year six. The 
years 1969 – 1973 patent information is used to select the sample for the year 1974 and 
firms with a 5-year total number of patents of 5 or more are selected. Subsequently, 1975 
uses patent information for the period 1970 – 1974. Thus the rolling sample procedure for 
selecting the sample ensures that the sample selection is based on past data information. 
It also avoids the problem of survivorship bias and at the same time it ensures that young 
but high patent firms are not left out of the sample 
A list of the top 10% high patent firms is provided in the Appendix Table 3A.  A 
close inspection indicates that most the firms are within computer, electronics, chemicals 
and other related technology industries. A significant number of the firms in the list are 
among the top 100 firms of the firms in Fortune 500. The firms in Appendix Table 3A are 
mostly the firms selected into the first quintile [high patent] portfolio. The table shows 
the aggregate number of patents issued to each firm and the average return for the period 
of the sample. The sample mean returns of firms are compared to corresponding Kenneth 
French industry portfolio returns for the same sample period.  With the exception of some 
                                                 
25 http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/ 
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few firms, almost all the firms performed better than the industry portfolio returns. Firms 
in paper business and electrical equipment industries were the only out-performed by the 
industry in the list. Siemens AG is the only firm that is not classified as one of Kenneth 
French’s 48 industry portfolios. From the patent data, it is assigned SIC code 9997 which 
is not assigned to any of the 48 industries. Appendix 3B provides t-statistics based on the 
firms listed in Appendix 3A and it shows a t-statistic of 5.550. This may provide an 
indication that firms with very high concentration of issued patents out-perform other 
firms within the same industry.  
The data sample covers the period 1969 – 2001 because patent data from Hall’s 
site is only available for these years. Firms are sorted into portfolios using previous 3–to–
12 ( J ) months of patents issued to firms and the estimated portfolio returns are based on 
3–to–12 ( K ) months holding period. The patent citation data covers the period 1975 – 
1999, and are used for a robustness check. Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1987) document 
that patent data may fail to capture heterogeneity in the performance of patents and the 
use of patent citation could provide a means to correct that.  
3.4.1  Trading Strategies 
The description of the trading strategy follows Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). If stock 
prices under-react to information, then investment strategies that select stocks based on 
the event of firm information may generate positive returns. In this study, I investigate 
the efficiency of the stock market regarding unexpected information on firm-issued 
patents. The strategy selects stocks based on the past 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters of firm issued 
patents and a holding period from 1 to 4 quarters.  
 At the beginning of each month t , stocks are ranked in ascending order on the 
basis of the firm’s issued patents in the past J months. Based on these rankings, ten 
decile portfolios are formed that are equally-weighted within each decile. The tenth 
decile is called the “HIGH” decile and the first decile is called the “LOW” decile. In each 
month t , the strategy buys the HIGH portfolio and sells the LOW portfolio, holding this 
position for K  months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Summary Results of Earnings and size  
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It is well documented in the literature that returns are driven by changes in underlying 
fundamentals. Firm earnings, earning surprises and earning announcements have always 
been a part of finance studies associated with changes in firm underlying fundamentals. 
Previous studies by Basu (1977) and Dreman and Berry (1995) provide insight into 
abnormal returns associated with firm earning announcements. La Porta et al. (1997) and 
Bernard et al. (1997) examine the stock returns around future earnings announcement 
dates. Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that the anomaly of the growth stock could be 
explained by expectational errors of earning performance. Stock returns tend to be high 
for firms that exceed earning expectation. The literature also documents return 
predictability based on earnings momentum. For example Jones and Litzenberger (1970) 
and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) investigate the relation between past 
earnings momentum and future returns. Following Dechow et al. (2003), Compustat data 
item 172 is used as the earnings variable.  
In this sub-section, I investigate the distribution of the portfolio returns of the 
trading strategies on the level of earnings. The relationship between earnings and stock 
returns lies at the core of the ‘rational bubble’ hypothesis where both the level and 
volatility of stock prices are related to the uncertainty regarding a firm’s average future 
profits [Pastor and Veronesi (2004; 2005)]. Table 3.1 presents a summary distribution of 
earnings as a ratio of size of firms as they are distributed among the portfolios formed 
based on patent trading strategies. The sample data covers the period 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
The results show that portfolios with high issued patents tend to report higher future 
earnings even after controlling for the size effect. 
Small-sized firms tend to be young, highly leveraged and more risky as compared 
to large-sized firms. Indeed the literature is full of conflicting explanations of the size 
effect on stock returns. Fama and French (1993) argue that size meets the definition of a 
pervasive risk factor or state variable. It is well documented in the finance literature that 
firms with small equity market values earn, on average, higher stock returns than firms 
with large equity market values [Berk (1995), Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1993)].  
The chapter also investigates whether abnormal profit from patent trading 
strategies may offer an explanation for the momentum profit as reported in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). Table 3.2 presents a summary distribution of firm-issued patents among 
 55 
momentum portfolios. The table shows that the momentum strategies may be consistently 
picking stocks with higher issued patents. And that the momentum strategies may capture 
systematic noise from firm patents. 
3.5.2 Returns of Trading Strategies 
The first hypothesis proposes the possibility of generating abnormal returns by adopting a 
trading strategy that buys and sells stocks on the basis of firm-issued patents. This sub-
section discusses the average returns of the 10 portfolios formed by sorting firms on the 
basis of issued patents. Table 3.3 reports the average returns of the different buy and sell 
portfolios, as well as zero-cost, HIGH26
J
 minus LOW portfolios. The average returns of 
almost all the zero-cost portfolios are positive and significant at the 99% confidence 
level. The most successful zero-cost strategy selects stock based on their previous 3 
months patents and then holds the portfolio for 3 months. This strategy yields 0.99% per 
month and this is quite comparable to the 1.31% estimated yield from the momentum 
strategy in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the 
momentum strategy that gives the highest zero-cost yield is =3, and K =12. Under the 
patent strategies described in this chapter, the anomaly is most significant during the 
recent past. People are able to better interpret the information with time. So with time the 
positive returns begin to decrease as investors are able to make better predictions of the 
value of patents. Thus with time, the quality of information improves and rational 
investors make better prediction of idiosyncratic risk from issued patents.  
In Table 3.3, the high patent portfolio generates positive returns on average. The 
positive returns decrease with an increasing K  month holding period. The low patent 
portfolio records low positive returns or in most cases negative average returns. 
Notwithstanding, the low patent portfolio shows a similar trend as the high patent 
portfolio, the low patent portfolio generates decreasing returns with an increasing K  
month holding period. The above results enforce the belief that short history ( 3=J ) of 
patent activities may make it more difficult to value the information content of patents as 
compared to long history of patent activities. Over time, the market learns and makes 
better prediction of the patent value of firms. Therefore estimation of average returns 
                                                 
26 HIGH refers to portfolio sorted by the highest level of firm-issued patents and LOW refers to portfolio 
sorted by the lowest level of firm-issued patents. 
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using the past 3 months patents may yield relatively higher returns than estimation based 
on the past 12 months patents. Similarly, relatively short holding period may perform 
better than long holding period as a result of market correction. This enforces the notion 
that over time, rational investors get better information and make rational decisions.  
 Figures 3.1 show the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the various buy and 
sell strategies. The graph uses the spread between the average returns of the various buy 
and sell strategies and aggregate market return data from Kenneth French’s data library. 
The CARs are estimated in excess of aggregate market returns and for K = 0 to 60 over 
the sample period 1970:01-2001:12. The graph shows that the estimated CARs of all the 
portfolios are on average increasing in K  (the holding period). However, the CARs of 
the high patent portfolio are increasing at a decreasing rate over the holding period. It is 
observed that the gap between high and low patent portfolios is growing with 
increasing K , peaks at 45=K  and begins to decrease. The increasing trend of the CAR 
for the high patent portfolio is what is expected on the basis that as you continue to hold 
the riskier or higher alpha asset you accumulate more positive returns.  The strategy 
consistently beats market expectations and the positive returns accumulate over the 
holding period.  
The observed result for the low patent portfolio is also growing with 
increasing K . The expectation is that low patent portfolios act as normal firms. Changes 
in the pattern of patents may not be an important characteristic for them. Any increase in 
returns may be due to some systematic risk or firm-level characteristic effect. To further 
investigate why an increasing pattern is observed, a critical look at the data sample is 
taken. If returns of firms tend to be higher on average than aggregate market returns from 
Kenneth French’s data library, then it is possible to observe growing CARs for low patent 
portfolios. Equally-weighted aggregate market returns are estimated from the data sample 
used for this chapter, and the results is reported in the robustness section.  
3.5.3 Trading Strategy Profit Explained by Systematic Risk 
Balvers and Wu (2006) argue that it may be possible to explain abnormal returns in the 
framework of unanticipated persistent changes in risks or risk premia. This may happen if 
a persistent increase in systematic risk comes about, if returns are initially low as prices 
adjust but subsequently are higher as expected returns have increased due to the increased 
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reward for risk. Similarly, if previous return realizations correlate with risk sensitivities, 
as suggested by Berk et al. (1999), a price pattern resembling the abnormal returns 
discussed in the previous sub-section may result. The Sharpe-Lintner one-factor model 
and the Fama-French three-factor model are used to test the second hypothesis, which 
suggest that the strategies may be systematically picking stocks on the basis of risk. This 
approach is consistent with Cahart (1997) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). They both 
test for the correlation between risk and the momentum profits. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that if the momentum profits proxy for a risk 
premium, then there would be a positive correlation between portfolio returns and CAPM 
beta from the standard one-factor or three-factor test.  A number of results are presented 
to evaluate the systematic risk implication of the patent profits. The results in Table 3.5 
are in two parts. Panel A are results with no risk correction (raw returns) and Panel B 
presents risk-adjusted returns using market risk as the correction factor. First, I present 
the raw excess returns, uncorrected for systematic risk from the trading strategy that uses 
past 3 month patents and 3 month holding period. In Table 3.5 panel A, the high-patent 
portfolio (decile 1) has 2.3% average non-risk-adjusted excess monthly return and the 
low patent portfolio (decile 10) has 1.4% average non-risk-adjusted excess monthly 
return. Table 3.5 panel B present results for the one-factor Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. This 
corrects for market risk and the results show that the high patent portfolio has 2.0% risk-
adjusted returns and the low patent portfolio has 1.2% risk-adjusted returns. Similarly, 
the Fama-French 3-factor risk-adjusted return for the high patent portfolio is 2.1% and 
the low patent portfolio is 1.4%, as reported in Table 3.6. At first sight, it seems the 
excess returns from patent portfolios are not explained by the risk factors. The evidence 
in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that there are no significant differences in the risk-adjusted 
returns and the raw returns.  
According to Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), if the patent portfolio returns could 
be explained by risk, then high patent portfolio would have a high CAPM beta and low 
patent portfolio would have a low CAPM beta. Also, the differences in betas would be 
statistically significant. From Table 3.5 panel B, the change in beta between high patent 
and low patent portfolios may account for only 6.09% of the difference in the unadjusted 
excess returns. Thus the estimated betas from Tables 3.5 show a slight decreasing trend 
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from 0.997 to 0.897 for high patent portfolio to low patent portfolio respectively. These 
differences in betas may suggest the strategy is systematically picking higher risk stocks 
in the higher-patent portfolios and vice versa. 
3.5.4 The 4-factor Results 
Following Carhart (1997)’s approach in constructing a momentum factor, I obtain 
the momentum (MOM) factor and similarly the patent (PATFACT) factor. MOM and 
PATFACT are returns on equal-weighted, zero-investment, factor mimicking portfolios 
for 12 months momentum27
In Table 3.9, both MOM and PATFCAT are included in the model. No significant 
changes in risk-adjusted returns are observed as compared to Tables 3.7 and 3.8. The 4-
factor model and the 5-factor model present some evidence to suggest that the abnormal 
returns from a patent trading strategy may be explained by patent and momentum factors. 
 in stock returns and past 3 months patents respectively. Table 
3.7 present results for the 4-factor Carhart model with MOM. The risk-adjusted returns 
for high patent portfolios reported in Table 3.7 are reduced significantly, as compared to 
the results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. For example the risk-adjusted excess return for the 
decile 1 (the high patent) portfolio reduces from 2.1% to 1.5%. The low patent portfolio 
only sees a 0.2% reduction in risk-adjusted returns excess. This may not be a surprise 
since top patent portfolios are where more interest would be expected in terms of noise 
generated by firm issued patents. Stock returns are expected to be more sensitive to 
patent shocks for high patent portfolios. The introduction of momentum factor also 
significantly reduces the risk-adjusted returns for the zero-cost portfolio. The risk-
adjusted return for the zero-cost portfolio drops from 0.7% monthly return to 0.3%. Table 
3.8 also presents results for the 4-factor model but this time with PATFACT. The results 
with PATFACT are similar to the results with MOM. The risk-adjusted return for the 
decile 1 portfolio reduces from 2.1% to 1.4%. The risk-adjusted return for the zero-cost 
portfolio drops to 0.1%. The 4-factor model with MOM and PATFACT also levels off 
the slight differences in the market betas for the portfolios as observed in Tables 3.5 and 
3.6. 
3.5.4 Patent Risk Factor 
                                                 
27 The momentum returns are estimated based on the past 12 months of stock returns. 
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This sub-section specifically investigates whether abnormal returns from patent trading 
strategies are explained by a patent risk factor. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) 
and La Porta (1996) argue that (value) strategies work because they capture systematic 
errors in the way investors form expectation about future returns. On the basis of this 
argument, a patent risk factor must reduce risk-adjusted returns since the patent strategies 
may be capturing systematic noise associated with investor expectations about returns. 
Table 3.10 presents results from the time series regression of excess (patent) portfolio 
returns against PATFACT and a constant. The results in Table 3.10 are compared to the 
raw portfolio returns in Table 3.5 panel A. The excess returns reduce from 2.2% to 1.3% 
for the high patent portfolio. The zero-cost investment portfolio returns also see a 
reduction from 0.8% to 0.1%. Comparing the results in Table 3.11 and Table 3.5 panel B, 
similar reduction in risk-adjusted returns are observed as in the case of Table 3.10 and 
Table 3.5 panel A. Overall, PATFACT explains a significant portion of the abnormal 
returns associated with high patent portfolios from patent strategies.  
3.5.5 Momentum Returns and Patent Factor 
This section investigates the linkage between momentum profits and the patent risk factor 
as proposed in the third hypothesis. The momentum returns are estimated from the data 
sample in this study using the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) methodology. Thus 
portfolios are formed based on the past 12 months of stock returns and are held for 6 
months. According to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that gives the most abnormal profit 
from the various strategies. The patent risk factor is estimated following the outline in 
Carhart (1997) for estimating a momentum risk factor. From the estimated patent 
portfolio returns, equal-weighted average of the top 30 percentile minus the equal-
weighted average of firms with the bottom 30 percentile is used as estimate of patent risk 
factor. The estimation method is consistent with Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997) and is over the sample period 1970:01 – 2001:12.  
Table 3.12 panel A presents results of the raw (unadjusted for risk) excess returns 
from the momentum strategies. The high momentum portfolio shows 2.6% monthly 
unadjusted excess return and the low momentum has 1.5% monthly unadjusted excess 
return. The zero-cost investment portfolio generates 1.0% monthly excess returns from 
the momentum strategies. The introduction of the market factor to correct for risk reduces 
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the monthly excess returns for the high momentum portfolio from 2.6% to 2.5%. 
Systematic risk adjustment accounts for 0.2% of the difference in the unadjusted monthly 
excess return from using the momentum strategies. This shows that the market risk factor 
explains very little of the momentum returns. Similarly, using Fama-French 3-factor 
model to account for risk, show little difference in the risk-adjusted returns of the 
portfolios [see Table 3.13]. Table 3.14 presents results from a time series regression of 
the excess portfolio returns on PATFACT and a constant term. The introduction of 
PATFACT explains a significant portion of the abnormal returns of the high momentum 
portfolio as compared to the raw excess returns in Table 3.12 panel A. The monthly 
excess return of the zero-cost investment portfolio becomes negative; virtually all the 
potential gains disappear! 
The four-factor model is used where the fourth factor in the model is the patent 
and momentum risk factors respectively. The main purpose of this sub-section is to 
investigate if momentum profits are explained by a patent risk factor or a momentum risk 
factor. If the fourth factor explains the momentum profit, its introduction must 
significantly reduce the risk-adjusted returns as captured by the alphas. Table 3.15 and 
Table 3.16 report the results from the 4-factor model with PATFACT and MOM as the 
respective fourth factors. The variable of interest is the CAPM alphas and similar to 
Table 3.14, the risk-adjusted return of the high momentum portfolio reduces significantly. 
Similar reduction is observed when only the patent factor and market risk factor are used. 
Table 3.18 shows that apart from the market risk factor, all that is needed is to adjust for a 
patent risk factor to achieve the same reduction in risk-adjusted returns. 
 
3.6 Robustness 
This section investigates minor changes to the underlying due to increased noise from 
firm issued patents, and subsequent market correction in future generates abnormal 
profits. Evidence presented in the previous section suggests that such is indeed the case. 
In this section, patent citations are used in place of patents. Griliches, Hall and Pakes 
(1987) document that patent data may fail to capture heterogeneity in economic data and 
the use of patent citation could provide a means to correct that. Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2001) use patent citation data to aid the explanation of the market value by 
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patents. They also argue that patent citation is a higher resolution measure of the 
information stock of traded firms. Thus citation data does not only aid the informational 
content of patent, but it is in itself an information variable. In this robustness check, I 
investigate whether the use of the citation variable would present any significant 
departure from the evidences in the main results. 
 3.6.1 Citations 
In this chapter, the patent citation variable is used as an alternative measure of firm-level 
information. The patent citation is used as the sorting variable to run the trading strategies 
outlined by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), thus similar to the patent variable discussed 
above. Table 3.19 reports positive excess return from holding stocks with high patent 
citations and selling stocks with low patent citations. The highest return, if citation is the 
sorting variable for high minus low portfolios, is 0.48% per month. This is significantly 
lower than the 0.99% per month for the patent variable, but nonetheless positive. Table 
3.20 panels A and B, present results of the raw excess returns and risk-adjusted excess 
returns for the citation strategies respectively. The excess return for the high citation 
portfolio reduces from 1.6% to 1.2% after correcting for market risk (Table 3.20 panel B) 
and Fama-French 3-factor risk (Table 3.21). This shows that risk-adjustment may have an 
impact on excess returns from citation strategies. Tables 3.22 and 3.23, which include the 
PATFACT, also show significant reduction in the risk-adjusted excess returns. The high 
citation excess return reduces from 1.2% to 0.8% per month, as observed from Tables 
3.20 and 3.23. The gains from the zero-cost investment portfolio are now significantly 
reduced, dropping from 0.7% to -0.1%.  The trend in the citation result is similar to that 
of the patent results, though the patent variable provides more abnormal returns 
compared to the citation variable. 
 3.6.2  Sample Sub-periods 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argued on the basis of Ross (1983) that the month January 
may impact the positive returns adversely. They report the zero-cost return for each 
calendar month of the year and evaluate the effect of seasonality on performance. 
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), I estimate zero-cost returns for the twelve 
calendar months. Table 3.24 reports the result of the monthly zero-cost returns for 3 
month holding period for the strategies that select stocks based on 3 and 6 month past 
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issued patents. November and December tend to exert a strong seasonal impact on the 
performance of the zero-cost returns.  
 3.6.3  CARs corrected for by equally-weighted market returns from sample 
To correct for the observed increasing trend in K -month holding period of the 
low patent portfolio corrected for aggregate market returns from Fama-French. Aggregate 
market returns are estimated from the data sample used in this chapter. Equally-weighted 
market returns are estimated from the sample and used to proxy for market returns. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that the CARs for the high patent portfolios are increasing with 
the holding period and the CARs for the low patent portfolios are decreasing with the 
holding period. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Trading strategies that buy stocks with past high firm-issued patents and sell stocks with 
past low patents realize significant abnormal returns over the period 1970 – 2001 covered 
under this study. The highest abnormal return of 0.99% per month is realized for the 
strategy that buys based on previous 3 months issued patents and hold for 3 months. The 
momentum strategy with the highest realized return is a slightly lower 1.31% for the 12-
month/3-month strategy. The evidence suggests that the abnormal return is persistent but 
dies down with time as the market corrects.  
 DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) explore the positive feedback 
trader effect on market prices where investors continuously evaluate the short-term and 
long-term prospects of firms and correct for market prices. Thus markets may correct for 
under-reaction generated by firm-issued patents over time as investors continuously 
evaluating firm’s short-term and long-term prospects. The evidence equally shows that 
abnormal returns may be due to systematic risk and is proxied by a patent risk factor. 
There is not enough evidence to decide between the two effects, systematic or behavioral. 
The study also provides evidence to suggest that the momentum profit could be explained 
by patent risk factors. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary Distribution of Earnings per Size by Portfolios 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The results are based on the data sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent 
data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  Summary results of average earnings per 
size distributed among the 10 decile portfolio are presented in the Table. Compustat data item 172 is used 
as earnings and it is defined as the net income in thousands of dollars. Size is estimated as the market value 
of stocks, measured in June of each year. 
 
 
 
 J=3 High                 Low 
K=3 0.4266 0.2422 0.1909 0.1355 0.0938 0.0621 0.0489 0.0204 0.015 0.0089 
K=6 0.4215 0.2266 0.1951 0.1211 0.0916 0.0615 0.045. 0.0211 0.0113 0.0081 
K=9 0.4199 0.2122 0.2003 0.1133 0.0908 0.0601 0.0471 0.0208 0.0129 0.0079 
K=12 0.4154 0.2112 0.1901 0.1127 0.0911 0.0591 0.0419 0.0201 0.0145 0.0073 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Summary Distribution of patents among momentum Portfolios 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  
The summary results of average monthly patents issued to firms and distribution among the 10 decile 
portfolios.  
 
 
 
 
J=12 High                 Low 
K=3 29.6 10.8 5.9 3.7 2.5 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.6 
K=6 29.8 11.2 4.8 3.1 2.1 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.6 
K=9 28.5 9.6 5.2 2.9 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.6 
K=12 28.1 7.5 4.0 2.7 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.6 
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Table 3.3 
Average Returns of Patent Portfolios  
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past J months of firm 
issued patents and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks 
in the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
The average monthly returns of these portfolios are presented in this Table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  High Low HIGH - LOW 
J=3 Ret  T-Stat Ret  T-Stat Ret  T-Stat 
K=3 0.0233 4.05 0.0134 1.80 0.0099 1.96 
K=6 0.0113 2.31 0.0093 0.64 0.0020 0.98 
K=9 0.0103 2.99 0.0012 1.37 0.0091 1.29 
K=12 0.0097 2.62 0.0053 1.38 0.0044 1.03 
J=6             
K=3 0.0179 3.92 0.0127 1.68 0.0052 2.11 
K=6 0.0113 3.33 0.0107 1.40 0.0006 1.99 
K=9 0.0114 2.74 0.0081 0.35 0.0033 1.15 
K=12 0.0109 3.21 0.0065 1.33 0.0044 1.56 
J=9             
K=3 0.0174 3.48 0.0139 1.73 0.0035 1.84 
K=6 0.0130 3.71 0.0078 1.47 0.0052 2.17 
K=9 0.0116 3.33 0.0069 1.42 0.0047 1.17 
K=12 0.0106 3.59 0.0039 1.46 0.0067 1.25 
J=12             
K=3 0.0155 3.62 0.0121 1.52 0.0034 1.91 
K=6 0.0079 3.51 0.0087 1.33 -0.0007 -1.07 
K=9 0.0077 3.27 0.0080 1.38 -0.0003 -0.74 
K=12 0.0109 3.45 0.0054 1.40 0.0055 1.31 
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Table 3.4 
Average Returns of Patent Portfolios 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past J months of firm 
issued patents and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks 
in the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
The average monthly returns of these portfolios are presented in this table.  
 
 
 
J=3 High                 Low High - Low 
K=3 0.0233 0.0133 0.0131 0.0130 0.0131 0.0132 0.0143 0.0132 0.0118 0.0134 0.0099 
K=6 0.0113 0.0075 0.0093 0.0090 0.0066 0.0092 0.0096 0.0069 0.0083 0.0093 0.0020 
K=9 0.0103 0.0114 0.0071 0.0075 0.0104 0.0071 0.0082 0.0108 0.0065 0.0012 0.0091 
K=12 0.0097 0.0068 -0.0047 -0.0090 0.0057 -0.0050 -0.0082 0.0063 -0.0055 0.0053 0.0044 
J=6 High                     
K=3 0.0179 0.0137 0.0137 -0.0058 0.0129 0.0129 -0.0057 0.0137 0.0120 0.0127 0.0052 
K=6 0.0113 0.0072 0.0068 -0.0047 0.0064 0.0064 -0.0046 0.0072 0.0056 0.0107 0.0006 
K=9 0.0114 0.0069 0.0089 -0.0057 0.0061 0.0084 -0.0054 0.0070 0.0078 0.0081 0.0033 
K=12 0.0109 0.0086 0.0215 0.0073 0.0076 0.0212 0.0078 0.0084 0.0205 0.0065 0.0044 
J=9                       
K=3 0.0174 0.0170 0.0145 -0.0176 0.0053 0.0142 -0.0057 0.0104 0.0082 0.0139 0.0035 
K=6 0.0130 0.0090 0.0092 -0.0053 0.0080 0.0087 -0.0049 0.0091 0.0077 0.0078 0.0052 
K=9 0.0116 0.0080 0.0097 0.0092 0.0069 0.0094 0.0098 0.0079 0.0084 0.0069 0.0047 
K=12 0.0106 0.0084 0.0055 0.0088 0.0074 0.0054 0.0095 0.0082 0.0044 0.0039 0.0067 
J=12                       
K=3 0.0155 0.0148 0.0074 -0.0018 0.0088 0.0073 -0.0016 0.0100 0.0058 0.0121 0.0034 
K=6 0.0079 0.0093 0.0082 0.0077 0.0083 0.0080 0.0083 0.0091 0.0067 0.0087 -0.0007 
K=9 0.0077 0.0074 0.0089 0.0076 0.0062 0.0089 0.0081 0.0069 0.0078 0.0080 -0.0003 
K=12 0.0109 0.0057 0.0077 0.0095 0.0044 0.0077 0.0102 0.0051 0.0067 0.0054 0.0055 
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Table 3.5 
 
Uncorrected Average Returns and Corrected Average Returns from Patent Trading 
Strategy 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  
Panel A present results of raw average returns, uncorrected for risk. Exret is the estimated average returns 
minus risk free rate for the 10 decile portfolios and the zero-cost portfolios. Panel B present results from the 
time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns and a constant 
term. Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. 
 
 
 
Panel A     Coefficients  T-values 
  Exret   B Constant Exmkt  Constant Exmkt 
High 0.022  High 0.020 0.997  9.41 8.79 
2 0.016  2 0.016 0.948  7.51 7.43 
3 0.017  3 0.016 0.957  7.80 7.64 
4 0.016  4 0.016 0.970  6.49 7.42 
5 0.016  5 0.015 0.948  7.77 8.09 
6 0.016  6 0.016 0.953  8.60 8.54 
7 0.018  7 0.017 0.936  7.70 8.27 
8 0.015  8 0.016 0.888  7.54 8.47 
9 0.016  9 0.015 0.844  7.51 7.81 
Low 0.014  Low 0.012 0.897  5.59 7.50 
High - Low 0.008  High - Low 0.008 0.100  5.05 2.91 
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Table 3.6 
 
Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French Three 
Factors 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  
Results presented is from the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess 
market returns, Fama-French size and value factors, and a constant term. Exmkt is the aggregate market 
returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB and HML are the size and the 
value factor from Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML  Constant Exmkt SMB HML 
High 0.021 0.981 0.425 -0.294  9.33 6.49 1.92 -1.06 
2 0.015 0.802 0.228 -0.336  7.32 5.80 1.26 -1.61 
3 0.017 0.778 0.205 -0.487  7.43 5.49 1.09 -2.28 
4 0.015 0.853 -0.009 -0.421  6.60 6.48 -0.07 -2.11 
5 0.015 0.834 0.083 -0.328  7.64 6.81 0.54 -1.74 
6 0.016 0.754 0.152 -0.428  9.18 6.18 0.97 -2.34 
7 0.017 0.861 -0.127 -0.435  7.75 6.66 -0.75 -2.23 
8 0.015 0.852 -0.070 -0.364  8.39 7.40 -0.50 -2.03 
9 0.015 0.783 -0.177 -0.435  7.76 6.47 -1.11 -2.28 
Low 0.014 0.732 -0.122 -0.631  6.47 5.89 -0.74 -3.35 
High - Low 0.007 0.249 0.547 -0.925  5.65 3.23 2.20 -3.32 
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Table 3.7 
 
Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French Three 
Factors and Momentum Factor 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  
Results presented is from the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess 
market returns, Fama-French size, value and momentum factors, and a constant term. Exmkt is the 
aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB, HML and 
MOM are the size, value and momentum factors from Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM 
High 0.015 0.743 0.129 -0.456 0.949  6.80 5.86 0.67 -2.00 10.54 
2 0.010 0.647 0.043 -0.435 0.847  5.04 5.07 0.25 -2.27 8.56 
3 0.011 0.657 0.056 -0.564 0.679  5.57 4.86 0.28 -2.81 6.45 
4 0.008 0.720 -0.166 -0.506 0.724  4.47 5.79 -1.02 -2.72 7.51 
5 0.009 0.723 -0.070 -0.414 0.699  5.43 6.13 -0.44 -2.36 7.99 
6 0.012 0.641 0.019 -0.501 0.723  7.19 5.50 0.15 -2.90 6.82 
7 0.011 0.757 -0.244 -0.502 0.715  5.94 6.04 -1.49 -2.67 5.71 
8 0.011 0.760 -0.174 -0.423 0.590  6.58 6.81 -1.25 -2.46 5.73 
9 0.011 0.700 -0.269 -0.488 0.489  6.14 5.90 -1.73 -2.64 4.80 
Low 0.012 0.747 -0.094 -0.621 0.344  6.46 5.96 -0.57 -3.30 1.61 
High - Low 0.003 -0.004 0.223 0.165 0.605  3.00 -2.14 1.88 1.48 3.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 
Table 3.8 
 
Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French Three 
Factors and Patent Risk Factor 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns, size 
and value factors, patent risk factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from 
Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB and HML are the size and the value factors 
from Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML Patfact  Constant Exmkt SMB HML Patfact 
High 0.014 0.713 0.054 -0.445 0.935  7.17 6.19 0.31 -2.03 9.83 
2 0.011 0.665 0.009 -0.425 0.897  5.27 5.25 0.06 -2.23 8.82 
3 0.012 0.667 0.029 -0.559 0.817  5.70 4.96 0.13 -2.79 6.77 
4 0.011 0.750 -0.173 -0.488 0.716  4.86 5.97 -1.05 -2.59 6.68 
5 0.011 0.750 -0.084 -0.398 0.661  5.79 6.32 -0.53 -2.24 7.38 
6 0.013 0.664 0.010 -0.486 0.846  7.53 5.68 0.08 -2.78 6.21 
7 0.014 0.789 -0.241 -0.482 0.756  6.37 6.23 -1.45 -2.53 4.60 
8 0.013 0.780 -0.184 -0.411 0.614  6.89 6.96 -1.31 -2.37 5.30 
9 0.013 0.727 -0.266 -0.471 0.517  6.54 6.08 -1.68 -2.52 3.80 
Low 0.013 0.775 -0.053 -0.603 0.454  7.07 6.24 -0.32 -3.22 2.85 
High - Low 0.001 -0.062 0.107 0.158 0.481  3.59 -1.46 1.27 1.40 3.64 
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Table 3.9 
 
Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French Three 
Factors, Momentum Factor and Patent Risk Factor 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns, size 
and value factors, momentum factor, patent risk factors and a constant term.  M-beta is the estimated 
market beta from the regression. SMB, HML and MOM are the size, value and momentum factors taken 
from Kenneth French data library. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM Patfact  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM Patfact 
High 0.016 0.868 0.043 -0.607 0.535 0.928  6.68 5.91 0.23 -2.76 3.41 8.81 
2 0.011 0.594 0.012 -0.393 0.415 0.859  4.15 4.68 0.08 -2.07 3.07 6.62 
3 0.013 0.638 0.093 -0.519 0.244 0.726  5.05 4.56 0.51 -2.48 1.63 5.42 
4 0.013 0.714 -0.230 -0.507 0.618 0.491  3.35 5.80 -1.43 -2.75 4.70 4.30 
5 0.011 0.662 -0.051 -0.458 0.552 0.544  4.85 5.80 -0.34 -2.68 4.53 4.92 
6 0.013 0.590 0.036 -0.532 0.486 0.567  6.52 5.29 0.25 -3.18 4.08 4.04 
7 0.014 0.722 -0.236 -0.505 0.626 0.412  5.28 5.91 -1.48 -2.77 4.80 2.46 
8 0.013 0.747 -0.243 -0.354 0.405 0.482  5.91 7.03 -1.75 -2.23 3.57 3.31 
9 0.012 0.657 -0.250 -0.352 0.509 0.257  5.04 5.86 -1.71 -2.10 4.25 2.01 
Low 0.013 0.717 -0.034 -0.594 0.477 0.228  6.13 6.02 -0.22 -3.33 3.75 2.24 
High - Low 0.002 0.151 0.077 -0.013 0.058 0.700  3.29 2.63 1.01 -0.15 0.92 3.04 
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Table 3.10 
 
Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Patent Risk Factor 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against patent risk factors and a constant 
term.   
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Patfact  Constant Patfact 
High 0.013 0.798  6.15 6.89 
2 0.010 0.760  4.24 8.89 
3 0.011 0.714  4.57 6.89 
4 0.010 0.611  3.84 7.19 
5 0.010 0.604  4.71 7.95 
6 0.012 0.547  6.16 6.89 
7 0.013 0.589  5.32 5.18 
8 0.012 0.419  5.68 5.89 
9 0.012 0.226  5.43 4.38 
Low 0.012 0.272  5.64 1.59 
High - Low 0.001 0.526  2.04 3.79 
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Table 3.11 
 
Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Market and Patent 
Risk Factor 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in 
the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms 
with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns, patent risk 
factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s data library 
minus the risk free rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt Patfact  Constant Exmkt Patfact 
High 0.014 0.902 0.940  6.92 7.18 8.85 
2 0.010 0.721 0.896  5.10 6.01 8.84 
3 0.012 0.749 0.770  5.45 5.87 6.80 
4 0.011 0.801 0.726  4.67 6.76 6.58 
5 0.011 0.809 0.704  5.58 7.22 7.36 
6 0.012 0.742 0.683  7.23 6.73 6.21 
7 0.014 0.839 0.736  6.20 7.01 4.49 
8 0.013 0.809 0.695  6.80 7.67 5.18 
9 0.013 0.754 0.497  6.46 6.69 3.68 
Low 0.013 0.856 0.461  6.76 7.31 2.89 
High - Low 0.001 0.046 0.479  3.60 2.95 3.47 
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Table 3.12 
 
Uncorrected Average Returns and Corrected Average Returns from Momentum 
Trading Strategy 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Panel A present results of raw average returns, uncorrected for risk. Exret is the estimated average returns 
minus risk free rate for the 10 decile portfolios and the zero cost portfolios. Panel B present results from the 
time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns and a constant 
term. Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. 
 
 
 
 
Panel    Panel Coefficients  T-values 
 A Exret   B Constant Exmkt  Constant Exmkt 
High 0.026  High 0.025 0.963  8.16 8.47 
2 0.023  2 0.023 1.004  7.55 7.73 
3 0.021  3 0.021 0.991  7.83 7.94 
4 0.017  4 0.018 0.984  7.06 7.16 
5 0.016  5 0.016 0.978  7.50 7.72 
6 0.017  6 0.016 1.013  7.69 8.27 
7 0.017  7 0.016 0.961  7.43 7.98 
8 0.015  8 0.016 0.927  6.79 7.72 
9 0.017  9 0.016 0.937  7.36 7.75 
Low 0.015  Low 0.012 0.959  6.13 7.39 
High - Low 0.010  High - Low 0.013 0.004  4.94 4.79 
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Table 3.13 
 
Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French 
Three Factors 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Results presented is from the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess 
market returns, Fama-French size and value factors, and a constant term. Exmkt is the aggregate market 
returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB and HML are the size and the 
value factors from Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-values 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML  Constant Exmkt SMB HML 
High 0.026 0.973 0.451 -0.309  8.19 7.74 1.98 -0.66 
2 0.022 0.919 0.364 -0.416  7.48 7.53 1.43 -1.94 
3 0.020 0.899 0.330 -0.487  7.49 7.35 0.88 -2.77 
4 0.015 0.920 0.280 -0.437  7.23 7.66 0.37 -2.58 
5 0.016 0.927 0.277 -0.369  7.45 7.98 0.45 -2.27 
6 0.017 0.895 0.318 -0.424  8.26 7.61 0.87 -2.58 
7 0.016 0.936 0.186 -0.459  7.57 7.82 -0.68 -2.63 
8 0.015 0.922 0.241 -0.444  7.81 8.02 -0.39 -2.69 
9 0.016 0.903 0.155 -0.512  7.78 7.68 -0.87 -2.96 
Low 0.014 0.873 0.179 -0.555  6.91 7.41 -0.72 -3.22 
High - Low 0.012 0.100 0.272 0.246  5.89 6.07 3.66 3.87 
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Table 3.14 
 
Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected for Patent Risk 
Factor 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against patent risk factors and a constant 
term.   
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-values 
  Constant Patfact  Constant Patfact 
High 0.011 0.912  6.22 8.73 
2 0.009 0.828  4.84 8.88 
3 0.009 0.757  5.01 7.54 
4 0.007 0.662  4.59 7.64 
5 0.009 0.629  5.00 8.05 
6 0.012 0.664  6.70 6.90 
7 0.012 0.619  5.70 5.13 
8 0.012 0.474  6.08 5.22 
9 0.011 0.331  6.19 4.14 
Low 0.012 0.343  6.16 2.04 
High - Low -0.001 0.569  -0.46 4.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
Table 3.15 
 
Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French 
Three Factors and Patent Risk Factor 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns, size 
and value factors, patent risk factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from 
Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB and HML are the size and the value factors 
from Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-Value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML Patfact  Constant Exmkt SMB HML Patfact 
High 0.012 0.826 0.230 -0.248 0.928  7.66 6.32 1.16 -1.05 8.73 
2 0.009 0.768 0.115 -0.437 0.828  4.32 5.78 0.64 -2.21 8.88 
3 0.009 0.736 0.061 -0.574 0.737  6.44 5.44 0.29 -2.85 7.54 
4 0.007 0.783 -0.031 -0.471 0.662  5.93 6.05 -0.20 -2.42 7.64 
5 0.009 0.819 -0.034 -0.335 0.633  4.33 6.72 -0.18 -1.80 8.05 
6 0.012 0.740 0.057 -0.439 0.664  8.07 5.97 0.37 -2.38 6.90 
7 0.012 0.834 -0.190 -0.488 0.662  6.82 6.41 -1.12 -2.41 5.13 
8 0.012 0.809 -0.074 -0.471 0.497  4.81 6.81 -0.55 -2.54 5.22 
9 0.011 0.776 -0.239 -0.603 0.331  4.83 6.15 -1.43 -3.04 4.14 
Low 0.011 0.766 -0.109 -0.656 0.344  6.48 5.98 -0.64 -3.38 2.04 
High - Low 0.001 0.061 0.339 0.408 0.584  3.39 2.86 2.42 3.33 4.54 
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Table 3.16 
 
Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French 
Three Factors and Momentum Factor 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Results presented are from the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against 
excess market returns, size and value factors, patent risk factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the 
aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB, HML and 
MOM are the size, value and momentum factors taken from Kenneth French data library. 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-Value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM 
High 0.015 0.743 0.129 -0.456 0.949  7.06 5.57 0.67 -1.52 6.14 
2 0.010 0.647 0.043 -0.435 0.847  4.79 4.62 0.25 -1.56 4.24 
3 0.011 0.657 0.056 -0.564 0.679  5.63 4.54 0.28 -1.94 2.96 
4 0.008 0.720 -0.166 -0.506 0.724  3.92 5.79 -1.02 -2.25 3.17 
5 0.009 0.723 -0.070 -0.414 0.699  5.49 5.78 -0.44 -2.16 4.03 
6 0.012 0.641 0.019 -0.501 0.723  7.16 5.29 0.15 -2.18 3.74 
7 0.011 0.757 -0.244 -0.502 0.715  5.78 5.90 -1.49 -2.27 2.54 
8 0.011 0.760 -0.174 -0.423 0.590  6.57 7.02 -1.25 -1.71 2.50 
9 0.011 0.700 -0.269 -0.488 0.489  5.58 5.85 -1.73 -1.61 2.00 
Low 0.012 0.747 -0.094 -0.621 0.344  6.16 5.77 -0.57 -2.14 0.64 
High - Low 0.003 -0.004 0.223 0.165 0.605  3.41 -1.39 1.88 0.52 3.20 
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Table 3.17 
 
Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-French 
Three Factors, Momentum and Patent Risk Factors 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns, size 
and value factors, patent risk factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from 
Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB, HML and MOM are the size, value and 
momentum factors taken from Kenneth French data library. 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM Patfact  Constant Exmkt SMB HML MOM Patfact 
High 0.013 0.786 0.052 -0.462 0.725 0.894  7.09 5.90 0.23 -2.77 3.42 7.85 
2 0.010 0.644 0.008 -0.438 0.655 0.859  4.62 4.66 0.08 -2.07 3.08 4.11 
3 0.011 0.655 0.028 -0.567 0.522 0.706  5.48 4.55 0.51 -2.48 1.64 3.04 
4 0.009 0.719 -0.176 -0.507 0.669 0.491  3.84 5.78 -1.43 -2.76 4.71 1.21 
5 0.010 0.722 -0.086 -0.415 0.612 0.548  5.37 5.78 -0.34 -2.68 4.54 2.06 
6 0.011 0.639 0.008 -0.502 0.662 0.567  7.06 5.28 0.25 -3.19 4.09 1.50 
7 0.010 0.757 -0.243 -0.502 0.718 0.455  5.77 5.89 -1.48 -2.77 4.81 0.07 
8 0.009 0.759 -0.186 -0.424 0.522 0.506  6.47 7.01 -1.75 -2.23 3.58 1.73 
9 0.010 0.701 -0.268 -0.488 0.496 0.257  5.57 5.84 -1.71 -2.11 4.26 0.16 
Low 0.011 0.750 -0.055 -0.618 0.456 0.229  6.63 6.00 -0.22 -3.34 3.76 1.84 
High - Low 0.002 0.036 0.106 0.156 0.270 0.665  2.46 1.15 1.25 1.09 0.94 4.01 
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Table 3.18 
 
Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected Market and Patent 
Risk Factors 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 12 months of firm 
returns and held for 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (decile 1) are stocks with high returns and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with low 
returns. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample that 
merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of portfolios formed 
based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results presented are from 
the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns, size 
and value factors, patent risk factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from 
Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-value 
  Constant Exmkt Patfact  Constant Exmkt Patfact 
High 0.012 0.962 0.824  7.30 8.21 7.93 
2 0.009 0.823 0.688  4.91 6.50 8.56 
3 0.010 0.823 0.586  5.39 6.56 5.80 
4 0.009 0.892 0.626  4.32 7.73 5.77 
5 0.009 0.826 0.545  5.79 7.95 6.94 
6 0.011 0.831 0.367  7.24 7.74 5.84 
7 0.010 0.895 0.419  6.30 7.84 4.13 
8 0.010 0.850 0.462  7.00 8.74 5.46 
9 0.011 0.835 0.284  6.21 7.43 3.50 
Low 0.011 0.914 0.306  6.76 8.48 3.14 
High - Low 0.001 0.048 0.518  3.84 2.20 5.19 
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Robustness Tables 
 
 
Table 3.19 
 
Robustness: Average Returns of Patent Portfolios with T-Statistics 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past J – month citations 
of issued patents and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks 
in the top decile (HIGH) are stocks with high patent citations and stocks in the bottom decile (LOW) are 
firms with low patent citations. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on 
the data sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 
1970:01 – 2001:12.  The value of J and K for the different strategies is indicated in the first column. The 
average monthly excess returns of the portfolios and the t-statistics are presented in the table 
 
 
 
  High Low High - Low 
J=3 Ret  T-Stat Ret  T-Stat Ret  T-Stat 
C=3 0.0155 3.507 0.0130 1.414 0.0025 2.030 
C=6 0.0132 2.439 0.0140 0.956 -0.0008 -0.084 
C=9 0.0102 2.455 0.0089 0.708 0.0013 0.150 
C=12 0.0104 2.052 0.0081 0.615 0.0023 1.070 
J=6             
C=3 0.0121 3.414 0.0087 1.314 0.0034 1.970 
C=6 0.0102 2.844 0.0073 0.864 0.0029 1.150 
C=9 0.0089 2.956 0.0108 0.649 -0.0019 -0.843 
C=12 0.0080 2.655 0.0065 0.599 0.0015 1.480 
J=9             
C=3 0.0121 2.958 0.0093 1.324 0.0028 2.015 
C=6 0.0094 3.191 0.0076 0.874 0.0018 1.151 
C=9 0.0110 2.774 0.0104 0.681 0.0006 0.725 
C=12 0.0096 2.976 0.0084 0.679 0.0012 1.544 
J=12             
C=3 0.0115 3.159 0.0087 1.179 0.0028 1.902 
C=6 0.0087 3.040 0.0067 0.807 0.0020 1.011 
C=9 0.0086 2.722 0.0079 0.662 0.0007 0.179 
C=12 0.0089 2.863 0.0072 0.639 0.0017 1.219 
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Table 3.20 
 
Robustness: Uncorrected Average Returns and Corrected Average Returns from 
Citation Trading Strategy 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
citations and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the 
top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high citations and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with 
low citations. The High-Low represents the zero cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Panel A present results of raw average returns, uncorrected for risk. Exret is the estimated average returns 
minus risk free rate for the 10 decile portfolios and the zero cost portfolios. Panel B present results from the 
time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market returns and a constant 
term. Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A    Panel B Coefficients  T-values 
  Exret    Constant Exmkt  Constant Exmkt 
High 0.0155  High 0.0124 0.872  7.50 7.82 
2 0.0156  2 0.0123 0.901  7.95 7.21 
3 0.0154  3 0.0121 0.866  7.09 7.73 
4 0.0156  4 0.0123 0.775  6.47 5.77 
5 0.0148  5 0.0118 0.836  7.68 7.19 
6 0.0171  6 0.0131 0.826  7.19 7.92 
7 0.0152  7 0.0122 0.810  8.26 7.19 
8 0.0149  8 0.0119 0.720  7.04 8.58 
9 0.0175  9 0.0132 0.743  6.96 7.59 
Low 0.0130  Low 0.0102 0.642  4.54 6.85 
High - Low 0.0025  High - Low 0.0022 1.030  2.52 1.67 
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Table 3.21 
 
Robustness: Average Returns from Citation Trading Strategy Corrected for Fama-
French Three Factors  
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
citations and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the 
top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high citations and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are firms with 
low citations. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data sample 
that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
Results presented are from the time series regression of the portfolio returns minus risk free rate against 
excess market returns, size and value factors, and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns 
from Kenneth French’s data library minus the risk free rate. SMB and HML are the size and the value 
factor from Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-values 
  Constant Exmkt SMB HML  Constant Exmkt SMB HML 
High 0.012 1.027 0.475 0.204  7.70 6.32 1.82 0.33 
2 0.011 0.866 0.413 -0.502  6.90 6.20 1.40 -2.22 
3 0.011 0.881 0.282 -0.431  7.32 6.09 0.76 -2.85 
4 0.010 0.966 0.216 -0.468  6.10 5.97 1.02 -2.25 
5 0.010 0.845 0.159 -0.424  7.41 7.20 0.48 -1.32 
6 0.013 0.943 0.143 -0.409  7.64 6.47 0.85 -2.02 
7 0.011 0.818 -0.109 -0.416  7.79 6.40 -0.69 -2.31 
8 0.010 0.872 0.053 -0.575  7.14 6.79 0.35 -2.83 
9 0.008 0.907 -0.291 -0.632  7.64 6.40 -1.26 -3.03 
Low 0.009 0.941 -0.194 -0.663  6.48 5.59 -1.13 -4.03 
High - Low 0.003 0.086 0.669 0.867  2.27 2.95 3.74 3.59 
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Table 3.22 
 
Robustness: Average Returns from Momentum Trading Strategy Corrected for 
Patent Risk Factor 
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
patent citations and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks 
in the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high citations and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are 
firms with low citations. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data 
sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 
2001:12. Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of 
portfolios formed based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results 
presented are from the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against patent risk 
factors and a constant term.   
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-values 
  Constant Patfact  Constant Patfact 
High 0.0085 0.758  5.66 7.97 
2 0.0084 0.619  4.57 9.10 
3 0.0084 0.577  4.47 7.69 
4 0.0081 0.529  4.50 8.00 
5 0.0074 0.467  4.51 7.67 
6 0.0087 0.262  6.22 6.95 
7 0.0070 0.169  5.27 6.13 
8 0.0064 0.223  2.45 5.50 
9 0.0093 0.110  3.91 4.41 
Low 0.0087 0.128  2.53 0.98 
High - Low -0.0002 0.630  -2.50 3.18 
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Table 3.23 
 
Robustness: Average Returns from Patent Trading Strategy Corrected for Market 
Risk and Patent Risk Factor 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
patent citations and held for 3 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks 
in the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high citations and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) are 
firms with low citations. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the data 
sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 
2001:12. Patfact is the patent risk factor estimated by subtracting the average of the bottom 30% of 
portfolios formed based on past firm issued patents from the average of the top 30% of portfolios. Results 
presented are from the time series regression of portfolio returns minus risk free rate against excess market 
returns, patent risk factors and a constant term.  Exmkt is the aggregate market returns from Kenneth 
French’s data library minus the risk free rate. 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients  T-values 
  Constant Exmkt Patfact  Constant Exmkt Patfact 
High 0.008 0.826 0.682  5.33 7.09 10.89 
2 0.008 0.901 0.478  4.62 8.21 9.68 
3 0.008 0.821 0.431  4.29 7.81 9.57 
4 0.008 0.907 0.518  4.72 7.38 8.75 
5 0.007 0.819 0.352  4.33 8.13 8.45 
6 0.009 0.870 0.203  6.22 7.42 7.24 
7 0.008 0.907 0.174  5.16 7.67 5.09 
8 0.008 0.855 0.171  3.29 8.07 4.00 
9 0.009 0.907 0.056  3.15 7.92 3.61 
Low 0.009 0.902 0.124  2.41 8.11 2.38 
High - Low -0.001 -0.076 0.558  -3.37 -0.92 4.38 
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Table 3.24 
 
Robustness: Sub-period Monthly Excess Returns  
 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the past 3 months of firm 
issued patents and held for J=3, 6 months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. 
Stocks in the top decile (decile 1) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (decile 10) 
are firms with low patents. The High-Low represents the zero-cost portfolio. The results are based on the 
data sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and the period of the sample used is 
1970:01 – 2001:12. The table presents the zero-cost excess returns for the 12 calendar months. 
 
 
 
  J=3   J=6 
  Returns T-values   Returns T-values 
January 0.0155 2.49  0.0131 1.61 
February 0.0045 1.08  0.0008 0.37 
March 0.0014 1.92  0.0014 1.42 
April  0.0018 2.41  0.0009 0.72 
May 0.0093 1.83  0.0019 1.17 
June 0.0043 0.91  0.0012 1.05 
July 0.0042 0.48  0.0021 0.88 
August 0.0128 2.11  0.0017 1.45 
September 0.0115 1.94  0.0025 1.20 
October 0.0152 2.73  0.0118 1.95 
November 0.0187 3.78  0.0141 3.89 
December 0.0179 3.17   0.0119 4.19 
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Figure 3.1 
 
Monthly Cumulative Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Kenneth French Aggregate 
Market Returns 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of past 3 months of firm issued 
patents and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (HIGH) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (LOW) are firms with low 
patents. The results are based on the data sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and 
the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  Monthly cumulative abnormal returns are estimated 
for the 10 decile portfolios for K= 0 – 60. The estimated abnormal returns are in excess of aggregate 
market return data from Kenneth French data library 
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Figure 3.2 
 
Monthly Cumulative Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Sample Estimated Aggregate 
Market Returns 
 
At the end of each month stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of past 3 months of firm issued 
patents and held for K months. 10 decile equally-weighted portfolios of stocks are formed. Stocks in the top 
decile (HIGH) are stocks with high patents and stocks in the bottom decile (LOW) are firms with low 
patents. The results are based on the data sample that merges CRSP, COMPUSTAT and patent data, and 
the period of the sample used is 1970:01 – 2001:12.  Monthly cumulative abnormal returns are estimated 
for the 10 decile portfolios for K= 0 – 60. The estimated abnormal returns are in excess of aggregate 
market returns. Aggregate market returns are estimated from the data sample used for the paper  
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Appendix. 3A 
List of the top tier of firms in the sample ranked by aggregate number of patent for the 
period 1970:01 – 2001:12. 
 
No. SIC CUSIP COMPANAY NAME 
AGG. 
PATENTS 
AVE. 
RETURNS 
AVE. IND. 
PORTFOLIO 
RET. INDUSTRY 
1 7370 45920010 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES 35,927 0.0101 0.0124 Business Services 
2 3600 36960410 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO-PRE 29,482 0.0116 0.0126 Electrical Eq. 
3 3577 13800630 CANON INC  -ADR 24,433 0.0137 0.0089 Computers 
4 3570 43357850 HITACHI LTD  -ADR 22,963 0.0187 0.0089 Computers 
5 3861 27746110 EASTMAN KODAK CO 18,320 0.0168 0.0094 Household Goods 
6 3571 62905020 NEC CORP  -ADR 18,260 0.0077 0.0089 Computers 
7 3663 62007610 MOTOROLA INC 16,369 0.0139 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
8 9997 82619750 SIEMENS AG  -ADR 15,785 0.0168     
9 4813 00206R10 AT&T INC 15,704 0.0134 0.0112 Communications 
10 3651 83569930 SONY CORP  -ADR 15,016 0.0140 0.0085 Recreational 
11 2820 26353410 DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOUR 14,715 0.0081 0.0105 Chemicals 
12 2800 07273030 BAYER AG  -ADR 14,092 0.0221 0.0105 Chemicals 
13 3577 98412110 XEROX CORP 13,616 0.0113 0.0089 Computers 
14 3861 35958N10 FUJI PHOTO FILM  -ADR 13,221 0.0059 0.0094 Household Goods 
15 3711 37044210 GENERAL MOTORS CORP-PRE 12,281 0.0078 0.0095 Automobiles 
16 3585 12490K10 WESTINGHOUSE ELEC-PRE F 12,035 0.0125 0.0096 Machinery 
17 3674 88250810 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 11,113 0.0159 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
18 2821 26054310 DOW CHEMICAL 10,472 0.0113 0.0105 Chemicals 
19 2800 05526250 BASF AG  -ADR 10,915 0.0186 0.0105 Chemicals 
20 3570 42823610 HEWLETT-PACKARD CO 9,309 0.0160 0.0089 Computers 
21 2670 88579Y10 3M CO 8,935 0.0102 0.0106 Paper Business 
22 2800 43439030 HOECHST AG  -ADR 7,944 0.0051 0.0105 Chemicals 
23 3600 74928510 RCA CORP 7,912 0.0116 0.0126 Electrical Eq. 
24 3674 59511210 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC 7,314 0.0225 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
25 2911 60708000 MOBIL OIL CORP 7,109 0.0139 0.0117 Oil 
26 3711 65474440 NISSAN MOTOR CO LTD  -A 6,939 0.0097 0.0095 Automobiles 
27 7373 90921410 UNISYS CORP 6,595 0.0106 0.0124 Business Services 
28 1311 82263500 SHELL OIL CO 6,551 0.0135 0.0117 Oil 
29 7373 54946310 LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 6,319 0.0093 0.0124 Business Services 
30 2840 74271810 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 6,252 0.0117 0.0094 Household Goods 
31 3674 00790310 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES 6,043 0.0189 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
32 3674 45814010 INTEL CORP 6,016 0.0219 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
33 3711 34537010 FORD MOTOR CO 5,835 0.0135 0.0095 Automobiles 
34 2870 61166W10 MONSANTO CO 5,786 0.0310 0.0105 Chemiclas 
35 3720 91301710 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES COR 5,686 0.0140 0.0127 Aircraft 
36 3531 14912310 CATERPILLAR INC-PRE FAS 5,646 0.0123 0.0096 Machinery 
37 2800 02532110 AMERICAN CYANAMID CO 5,105 0.0119 0.0105 Chemicals 
38 2834 58933110 MERCK & CO 5,013 0.0140 0.0126 Drugs 
39 3350 90320010 UOP INC 4,750 0.0086 0.0078 Steel  
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No. SIC CUSIP COMPANAY NAME 
AGG. 
PATENTS 
AVE. 
RETURNS 
AVE. IND. 
PORTFOLIO 
RET. INDUSTRY 
40 3822 43850610 HONEYWELL INC 4,671 0.0132 0.0105 Measuring  
41 2860 90558100 UNION CARBIDE CORP 4,594 0.0121 0.0105 Chemicals 
42 2911 88169410 TEXACO INC 4,390 0.0101 0.0117 Oil 
43 3714 27805810 EATON CORP 4,068 0.0133 0.0095 Automobiles 
44 3721 09702310 BOEING CO 3,972 0.0160 0.0127 Aircraft 
45 2851 69350610 PPG INDUSTRIES INC 3,825 0.0123 0.0105 Chemicals 
46 3714 87264910 TRW INC 3,803 0.0120 0.0095 Automobiles 
47 3678 03189710 AMP INC 3,665 0.0146 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
48 2834 53245710 LILLY (ELI) & CO 3,616 0.0117 0.0126 Drugs 
49 3640 36299900 GTE PRODUCTS CORP 3,522 0.0109 0.0126 Electrical 
50 2800 30249130 FMC CORP 3,516 0.0131 0.0105 Chemicals 
51 3011 38255010 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 3,391 0.0096 0.0095 Automobiles 
52 3679 21935010 CORNING INC 3,355 0.0139 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
53 7011 45091210 ITT CORPORATION 3,160 0.0206 0.0103 Resturants 
54 3579 80303830 SANYO ELECTRIC CO LTD 3,057 0.0022 0.0089 Computers 
55 2834 71708110 PFIZER INC 2,977 0.0128 0.0126 Drugs 
56 3571 86681010 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 2,949 0.0211 0.0089 Computers 
57 3578 62886000 NCR CORP 2,890 0.0141 0.0089 Computers 
58 3714 08168900 BENDIX CORP 2,825 0.0131 0.0095 Automobiles 
59 2810 38388F10 GRACE (W R) & CO 2,812 0.0406 0.0105 Chemicals 
60 3812 75511150 RAYTHEON CO 2,705 0.0139 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
61 3523 24419910 DEERE & CO 2,698 0.0143 0.0096 Machnery 
62 2834 00282410 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 2,697 0.0145 0.0126 Drugs 
63 2834 80658520 SCHERING AG  -ADR 2,645 0.0149 0.0126 Drugs 
64 3674 63764010 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR 2,627 0.0214 0.0120 Electronic Eq 
65 3350 68066520 OLIN CORP 2,619 0.0116 0.0078 Steel  
66 2911 03190400 AMOCO CO 2,526 0.0142 0.0117 Oil 
67 2844 19416210 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO 2,480 0.0132 0.0094 Household Goods 
68 2911 04882510 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 2,441 0.0137 0.0117 Oil 
69 2834 93448810 WARNER-LAMBERT CO 2,381 0.0159 0.0126 Drugs 
70 7372 59491810 MICROSOFT CORP 2,321 0.0294 0.0124 Business Services 
71 3570 25384910 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT 2,269 0.0160 0.0089 Computers 
72 2821 77537110 ROHM AND HAAS CO 2,248 0.0115 0.0105 Chemicals 
73 3559 03822210 APPLIED MATERIALS INC 2,243 0.0253 0.0096 Machnery 
74 2810 00915810 AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICAL 2,208 0.0134 0.0105 Chemicals 
75 2834 85224510 SQUIBB CORP 2,146 0.0158 0.0126 Drugs 
 
 
Appendix. 3B 
Student t-statistics of the returns of the top tier firms in the sample compared to the 
industry returns. 
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          =  0.00376 
 
Where iIr  is the average return over the sample period for an individual firm i listed 
under industry I . IR  is the average return over the sample period for industry I  
 
T-Statistics = 
n
mean
/σ
 
   5.550 
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Chapter 4. Money Illusion in the Stock Market: International 
Evidence. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Money illusion28 refers to the phenomenon according to which people confuse nominal 
dollar amounts with real purchasing power. Macroeconomics theory29
There is broad recognition in the literature of global financial market 
interdependence. Eun and Shim (1989) examine the interdependence of the nine largest 
international financial markets. They find evidence of market interdependence, and also, 
that the US financial market exerts strong influence on the other financial markets. 
Hamao et al. (1990) provided evidence to show the transmission of stock market shocks 
from New York to Tokyo and London and from London to Tokyo, but not from Tokyo 
either to New York or London. In view of market interdependence, do international 
finance markets also suffer from money illusion as hypothesized by Modigliani and 
Cohn? This chapter addresses this question by looking at two classes of markets. First, 
the question is addressed to the developed financial markets. Technological advancement 
 often stipulates 
that nominal variables cannot influence real variables. It is then inconceivable to expect 
investors to err when it comes to stock pricing, discounting real cash flows by nominal 
required returns. According to the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, investors make this exact 
mistake. Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005) perform an empirical test to show that the 
US stock market investors suffer from money illusion. That is, during periods of rising 
inflation, stocks are over-valued and during periods of falling inflation, stocks are under-
valued. Fama (1981) substantiates the pricing anomaly by providing evidence to show the 
inverse relation between real stock values, representing ownership of the income 
generated by real asset, and nominal inflation. However, Balvers and Huang (2009) 
present contradictory evidence to suggest that there is no money illusion in the US stock 
market. They show that once real money growth is accounted for in the Cohen et al. 
(2005) model lagged inflation has no explanatory power for the cross section of returns. 
                                                 
28 The term “money illusion” was coined by John Maynard Keynes early in the twentieth century. In 1928 
Irving Fisher gave the subject a thorough treatment in his book “The Money Illusion”. 
29 Classical dichotomy in macroeconomics is a feature of many classical and new classical theories of 
macroeconomics. However, the Keynesians sticky price models reject the classical dichotomy. 
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and communication inter-connectivity enables information to be transmitted swiftly 
between developed countries. Second, the question is addressed to emerging financial 
markets. These two market groups are addressed separately because the level of market 
integration among developed markets and among emerging markets is different. The 
chapter presents some evidence to show that the international developed markets suffer 
from some degree of money illusion. Some individual countries may appear to be 
insulated from money illusion, but on average, the international markets may suffer from 
money illusion. At the same time the results may offer support to Balvers and Huang 
(2009) who argue that what looks to be the effect of money illusion may in fact be the 
equilibrium asset pricing impact of money growth on the transaction-cost adjusted 
marginal value of wealth. The evidence on emerging markets may not be enough to 
conclude that emerging markets suffer from money illusion. 
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows:  Section II 
provides the literature review and model description, where the research question is 
defined. Section III presents the data used for the chapter. Section IV provides the 
empirical results. Section V presents the robustness of the research findings. Section VI 
concludes the chapter.  
4.2 Literature Review and Model Description 
To what extent are financial markets influenced by the macroeconomy? Efforts have been 
made to model the linkage of stock prices to consumption through the first order 
conditions of individual investors, as noted for instance by Balvers and Huang (2009). 
The ‘Fed Model’, the leading model for equity valuation, relates the yield on stocks to the 
yield on bonds [Asness (2003)]. Thus the model pitches stocks, representing ownership 
of the income generated by real assets, against nominal bonds as two competing assets in 
the financial markets. If the yield on bonds rises, then for stocks to stay competitive, the 
yield on stocks must also rise. Empirical work by Asness (2000, 2003) suggests that 
inflation is the main influence on bond yield. Thus during periods of rising inflation, the 
yield on bonds will rise to keep pace with inflation as suggested by Asness (2000). Now 
if inflation drives nominal bond yield and bond yield co-moves with stock yield then 
indirectly, stock yields are being driven by inflation as the Fed Model seems to suggest. 
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However, inflation is a nominal variable and the stock yield is the return on real cash 
flow from investment. Modiglani and Cohn (1979) hypothesized that stock market 
investors may be suffering from money illusion. The investors discount real cash flows 
by nominal discount rates. The reality of this is that the time variation of inflation may 
lead to the market’s subjective expectation of the equity premium to systematically 
deviate from rational expectation [Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005)]. Cohen, Polk 
and Vuolteenaho (2005) present evidence to show that the US stock market investor 
suffers from money illusion of this sort. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether international financial 
markets suffer from money illusion. The literature documents significant co-movement in 
stock prices across countries. Eun and Shim (1989), Hamao et al. (1990) and, Karolyi and 
Stultz (1996) not only provide evidence of co-movements, but also argue that the US 
market exerts significant influence on other stock markets. Ng et al. (1991) and Ng 
(2000) find significant spillovers among the Pacific Rim countries, and Booth et al. 
(1997) provide evidence for price and volatility spillovers among the Scandinavian 
countries. 
4.2.1. Hypotheses 
This chapter contributes to the literature by investigating whether stock market 
interdependence provides a transmission channel for the transfer of investor irrationality 
across countries. If the US market exerts significant influence on other stock markets 
[Eun and Shim (1989)], and if the US market suffers from money illusion [Cohen, Polk 
and Vuolteenaho (2005)], then the expectation is that the international market must also 
suffer from money illusion. The scope of the investigation in this chapter extends beyond 
developed markets to include emerging markets. Two hypotheses are proposed: 
  Hypothesis 1  
Developed international financial markets suffer from money illusion of 
the nature described by Modigliani and Cohen. 
 
Market liberalization and increased sales of securitized financial assets across the 
international markets offer the platform for the transmission of market mistakes. 
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Worldwide improvements in information processing enable market movements in one 
domestic market to be instantly transmitted across countries, and they end up affecting 
domestic markets of other countries. For example, for stocks in the UK to stay 
competitive to increases in yields of US stocks, UK stock prices must also fall. Failure of 
UK stock yield to rise and stay competitive with US stocks may lead to capital outflow 
from the UK to the US. To prevent potential capital outflow, UK stock yields must also 
rise. 
 This chapter addresses money illusion not only in developed markets, but also in 
emerging markets. Emerging economies and their markets are faced with different sets of 
economic challenges compared to those of developed markets. Notable and of direct 
bearing on this chapter, is monetary policy. Central banks of developed markets tend to 
be more independent of government inflationary demands. Monetary policies by central 
bank are independent of central government influence. The central goal of a central 
bank’s monetary policy is price stability, and the credibility of the central bank to deliver 
on that depends on how independent the bank is from central government influence. A 
number of papers attribute central bank credibility to their independence. Notable among 
them are Posen (2000) and Mishkin (2000). Both argue that independent central banks 
can resist inflationary demands of governments and its policies are inherently more 
credible. Rogoff (1985) argues that the inflationary bias problem can be solved if 
monetary policy is conducted by those who are inflation-averse.  
Hypothesis 2 
Emerging financial markets do not suffer from money illusion of the 
nature described by Modigliani and Cohen. 
 
Kim et al. (1998) and Almeida et al. (2004) argue that increased financial integration 
makes countries vulnerable to contagion from both within the region and outside the 
region. As argued above, competition among integrated markets may serve as the channel 
for money illusion to affect markets. Emerging markets are less integrated with the 
international finance market. Given friction in capital account convertibility and 
limitations in the flow of information, emerging markets may not be very sensitive to 
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stock price movements in the developed markets. In effect, this hypothesis proposes that 
emerging market do not suffer from money illusion as hypothesized by Modigliani and 
Cohen.  
4.2.2. Model 
An alternative model is presented in this chapter that builds on the Cohen, Polk and 
Vuolteenaho (2005) model. The modification30 allows for either a one-pass31
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 or two-pass 
empirical evaluation of the testable implication of money illusion. The model allows for 
the complex three-pass method to be side-stepped. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) formulation is outlined in the model by Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005). 
As outlined in Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005), I make the assumption that stock 
market investors discount the present value of real cash flow by a nominal discount rate, 
appealing to the ‘Fed Model’, that makes the same mistake, but has been proven to 
perform consistently well over the years in developed markets. I consider the Gordon 
growth model for valuing stocks and impose the assumption of money illusion. So for a 
given firm i, you can write; 
                                                                                                    (4.1)  
Where Eik is the required nominal return and igˆ  is the constant projected growth rate of 
cash flows or dividends, and tD is dividends at time t . The growth rate of cash flow may 
potentially not be constant due to time variation in inflation. In the Gordon growth model 
dividend growth is assumed to be a constant g (based on the long term average inflation 
rateπ ). If the market could make a perfect prediction of inflation, then observed inflation 
π  must be equal to the expectation inflation (π ). Otherwise, the growth rate of 
dividends would be subjected to time variation in expected inflation. The difficulty in 
estimating the long term future growth rate of dividends makes agents assume a constant 
growth rate g. I also assume an imperfect money illusion; typically not all investors are 
irrational. Then the variation factor is assumed to be a linear function of the deviation of 
observed inflation from the expected.  
                                                 
30 Empirical model is developed and published in the lecture notes of Ronald Balvers, West Virginia 
University. http://www.be.wvu.edu/divecon/econ/balvers/ 
31 One-pass is a one stage CAPM regression analysis. 
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)(ˆ ππ −−= fgg ii                                                                                             (4.2) 
 
Now if we have a perfect money illusion, thus all investors suffer from this phenomenon, 
then the expression πππ −=)(f  must be satisfied. However under the assumption that 
there is an imperfect money illusion because some investors are rational and others are 
irrational, it would be a reasonable assumption to set )()( ππγππ −=−f , with 10 << γ . 
Due to the stickiness and persistent nature of inflation, it is easy to use the rule of thumb, 
where expected inflation is estimated based on the recent past inflation [Friedman-Phelps 
(1968)]. This chapter adopts the backward-looking approach where expected inflation is 
estimated to follow a random walk [Ball (2000) and Atkeson and Ohanian (2001)]. From 
equation (1) the expected yield is calculated as 
it
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And by definition, the expected capital gain 
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P
PPE
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−− )( 1                                                                                              (4.4) 
Then the dividend yield and capital gain may be combined to find an expression for the 
expected return given as, 
)(ˆ ti
E
itit fk πµ +=                                                                                                (4.5) 
Thus you get an important result that suggests that the mean return for any stock i. 
exceeds the required return on the stock by the same proportion which depends positively 
on inflation. If the same assumption is made as Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005) that 
the required return satisfies the CAPM, then you can write 
)( nf
E
mti
n
f
E
it rkrk −=− β                                                                                        (4.6) 
Where nfr is the risk free rate, iβ  is the stock’s market beta, which according to the 
CAPM is the sole relevant measure of risk, and Emk is the required return on the market 
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portfolio. Then from equation (3.5), an extension could be made to derive the mean 
return of the aggregate market portfolio and substituted into equation (3.6).  
    ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ                                                             (4.7) 
Now since )()( tttf ππγπ −= , then the stock alpha, the part of expected return 
unexplained by the CAPM is given as ( ) )(1 ititii ππγβα −−= . The model leads to four 
testable implications for the presence of money illusion. Case 1 is for 0)( <− itit ππ  
and 1>iβ  then iα  must be positive and significant.  Case 2 is for 0)( <− itit ππ and 
1<iβ , the iα  must be negative and significant. Case 3 is for 0)( >− itit ππ and 1>iβ , 
the iα  must be negative and significant. Case 4 is for 0)( >− itit ππ and 1<iβ , the iα  
must be positive and significant. If empirical tests of all the four cases are satisfied, this 
would lead to a conclusion that the international financial markets suffer from money 
illusion. The intuitive explanation of the theory is that during periods of rising inflation 
(positive inflation shock), stocks with beta less than one (case 4) would be over-priced 
and during periods of falling inflation (negative inflation shock), stocks with beta less 
than one (case 2) would be under-priced. Similarly, during periods of rising inflation, 
stocks with beta greater than one (case 3) would be under-priced and during periods of 
falling inflation, stocks with beta greater than one (case 1) would be over-priced. 
If there is mispricing as the theory suggests, then some rational agents could profit 
because this may provide an arbitrage opportunity. A few rational investors would buy 
stocks when they are underpriced during times of rising inflation and sell during time of 
falling inflation. As noted in Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005) this would not be the 
case. They cite the slow adjustment process of price correction which would not make 
this easy. If price adjustment process is slow, then the adjustment process introduces 
additional uncertainty. Arbitrage profit is possible under the assumption of constant risk. 
In this case, more uncertainty rules out the possibility of an arbitrage profit.  
The single pass regression in equation (4.7) is run to test the implication of money 
illusion in international markets. From the 4 cases listed above, two sets of regressions 
are run. The country portfolios are partitioned into two periods of negative inflation 
shocks and positive inflation shocks. Separate regressions are run for the two periods, and 
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from the results, the 4 cases are evaluated by identifying countries with beta greater than 
one and countries with beta less than one. Fama-McBeth (1973) suggests the use of 
rolling beta estimation with a trailing window of 60 months in portfolio formation and 
also out of sample portfolio beta estimation. This is to increase the noise-to-variability 
ratio and also to reduce measurement errors. However, the estimation method used in this 
paper follows Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), where the portfolios are the country 
market returns. I have a relatively short sample period and as a result I impose the 
assumption of constant beta for the sample period. I use the Black, Jensen and Scholes 
(1972) estimation method to test the implication of money illusion by running a single 
pass regression of equation (4.7). 
Under the first hypothesis, developed markets suffer from money illusion. On the 
basis of the theoretical result investors wrongly specify the dividend yield ( igˆ ) on stocks. 
Intuitively, this mis-specification could be explained through domestic sources or through 
foreign sources. Developed markets have well-developed bond markets that could 
compete with the stock market. Using the example of the Fed Model as argued by 
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), igˆ  may be subject to an inflation factor that is driven 
by bond yields. Similarly, money illusion could be a result of foreign sources through 
market interdependence. The implication is that, for developed markets if 1>iβ , then 
( ) 0)(1 <−−= ititii ππγβα   and significant for itit ππ >  where γ  is a positive constant. 
Similarly, if 1<iβ , then  ( ) 0)(1 >−−= ititii ππγβα   and significant for itit ππ > . The 
second hypothesis stipulates that emerging markets may not suffer from money illusion 
since they are not fully integrated with international financial markets. Intuitively, it 
could be argued that the bond markets32
igˆ
 of emerging countries are not developed enough 
for bonds and stocks to effectively compete for investments. Hence, from the theoretical 
model,  may not be subject to the inflation factor that is driven by bond yield, both 
local and foreign. The model implication is that, for emerging markets, the four cases 
listed above would not hold. 
                                                 
32 G8 2007 Finance ministers meeting. Potsdam May 19th 2007. Document title: Action plan for developing 
local bond market in emerging markets economies and developing countries. 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/g8finance-bond.pdf 
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The first pass regression [equation 3.7], estimates alphas, the part of the risk 
premium unexplained by the market risk premium and asset specific beta, in our case 
country betas. Alphas are to be interpreted as the abnormal return of an asset. Hence, the 
estimated alphas should capture the information concerning money illusion if present. 
These test implications are similar to that of Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005). When 
inflation is high, rational equity premium expectation is higher than the market’s 
subjective expectation and as such the stock market is under-valued.  
4.3   Data 
The financial market data for developed countries used in this chapter is taken from the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI33) data. The MSCI data compiles monthly 
country indices, which include dividends for developed markets, and the sample used in 
this chapter spans the period from January 1970 to December 2005. A sample of sixteen 
countries34 is selected from the MSCI data on the basis of countries with data spanning 
the specified period35
Log differencing is used to compute the nominal monthly returns from the price 
indices (including dividends) in both MSCI and emerging market data. Data are usually 
converted from nominal returns to real returns by subtracting inflation. However, since 
 January 1970 to December 2005. The financial data for emerging 
markets are from the emerging market database (EMDB). This is a Monthly Stock Series 
that combines the International finance corporation (IFC) version, which has data up to 
October 1997, and Standard and Poor’s version, with data up to May 2001. Emerging 
market dataset has firm-specific data from 30 countries covering an unbalanced period 
from 1982 to 2000. This number is reduced to 16 countries by including countries with 
firm level data of 500 or more, and country portfolios are formed for each country for the 
period 1987 to 2000. MSCI compiles data of country indices for emerging countries. 
However, using MSCI emerging market data would reduce the sample period and the 
number of countries included. 
                                                 
33 MSCI monthly indices are constructed using every listed security in a market free float adjusted, 
classified in accordance with Global Industry Standard and screened by size, liquidity and minimum float 
34 The MSCI sample consist of US, UK, Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Norway, Belgium, Japan, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore 
35 The focus of this paper is to evaluate the presence of money illusion in developed and emerging market. 
Since contrasting the two markets is not the objective, the difference in the two data periods is not an issue 
of concern. However, I include in the robustness results for the developed market from 1987:01 – 2005:12. 
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excess returns are used, the inflation rate cancels out. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
data is taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) data CD. Log differencing is 
used to compute the monthly inflation rate for all countries in the sample. All prices are 
dollar quoted; hence there is no need for currency conversion. I use the risk free rate of 
the US as a common risk free rate for all the countries, since prices are in US dollar and 
the analysis is taken from the perspective of an investor in the US.  
There are many formulations of expected inflation, but the advantage of the 
backward looking version stems from the empirical success and the persistent nature of 
inflation. A number of authors model inflation as a random walk [eg. Atkeson and 
Ohanian (2001) and Ball (2000)]. From the estimated long-run inflation, the deviation of 
actual inflation from the expected long-run are computed. This is to measure inflation 
surprises and test the implication of money illusion. Actual inflation is computed by 
taken the log difference in the CPI. The sample is partitioned into periods of high and 
periods of low inflation and the regression model in equation 7 is run. 
4.4 Empirical Results:  
 4.4.1 Summary Results 
Inflation is the prominent variable of interest when evaluating money illusion. Cohen, 
Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005) explain that during periods of high inflation, stock returns 
are under valued and during periods of low inflation, stock returns are over-valued. I 
estimate inflation shock (surprise) variables. Inflation surprises are estimated by taking 
the monthly difference in actual inflation and expected inflation. Periods of positive 
inflation shocks are grouped together and analyzed separately from periods of negative 
inflation shock. Actual inflation is computed from Consumer Price Index (CPI) data and 
expected inflation is estimated using the past one year inflation rate. The summary results 
in Table 4.1 show that on average, Italy and United Kingdom experience relative higher 
negative inflation shocks as compared to the rest of the developed countries. On the other 
hand, German, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Sweden and Singapore experience higher 
positive inflation shocks. Italy and United Kingdom may be showing up in both the high 
negative and positive shock groups because of more variability in their inflation data.  
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 Table 4.2 presents results of average monthly stock returns of developed markets. 
Results in Table 4.2 are based on MSCI international data. Stocks in the Netherlands, 
Sweden and United Kingdom on average perform significantly better compared to other 
countries in the sample for the period of the study. Japan, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Austria, 
Norway, United Kingdom and Singapore show a relatively high standard error, an 
indication that those markets may be more risky. Comparing the summary results in the 
two tables (Table 4.1 and 4.2), it does not appear that there is a clear link between high 
inflation shock and return variability. Countries with moderate levels of inflation perform 
relatively well. This may be an indication that some moderate level of inflation may be 
good for a country’s financial market. 
4.4.2 Empirical Results on the Money Illusion for Developed markets 
The main focus of this chapter is to evaluate whether the international financial markets 
suffer from money illusion as is proven to be the case for the US market.  In this sub-
section, the empirical implication of money illusion is evaluated for developed markets in 
the data sample used for this chapter. The results are based on the empirical model in 
equation (4.7) and the four empirical implications (Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4) are examined. For 
example, if observed inflation is less than the expected inflation, then the presence of 
money illusion would imply that if the coefficient on excess world returns (Ex-World) is 
less than one, then the coefficient of country inflation (Inf-Alpha) must be negative and 
significant (Case 3). Table 4.3 examines the empirical implications of Case 1 and Case 2. 
Seven countries fall under Case 1, since the estimated beta for these countries is greater 
than one. According to Case one, for the money illusion condition to be satisfied, then the 
mean Inf-Alpha coefficient for these countries must be positive and significant. The 
correct sign is observed for the Case 1 results but it is not significant. The mean Inf-
Alpha coefficient for Case 2, according to the empirical implication must be negative and 
significant to satisfy the presence of money illusion is the other nine countries. This is 
observed to be the case from the results in Table 4.3. 
 Table 3.4 examines the implication for Case 3 and Case 4 for developed markets. 
From the results, nine countries have estimated beta greater than one. According to Case 
3, Inf-Alpha must be negative and significant to satisfy the presence of money illusion.  
The mean inflation coefficient (Inf-Alpha) has the expected sign and it is significant at 
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the 95% confidence level. The mean results for Case 4 have the opposite sign required for 
money illusion. Overall, three of the cases have the required sign and among them two 
are significant at the 95% confidence level. Only one case, Case 4 has the opposite sign 
but is economically small. 
 4.4.3 Empirical Results on the Money Illusion for Emerging Markets 
The second hypothesis proposes that emerging markets may not suffer from money 
illusion since they are not fully integrated with the international financial markets. Ng, 
Chang and Chou (1991) argue that evidence of a spillover effect is present only if 
international investment restrictions are relaxed between developed and developing 
markets. 
The empirical model ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  is run using emerging 
markets data and the results are presented in Table 4.5 and 4.6. The four empirical 
implications are evaluated to determine the presence of money illusion in emerging 
markets. Table 4.5 presents results from the regression analysis using negative inflation 
shocks. The results show that all the countries in the sample have estimated beta less than 
one. Thus the results exclude the empirical implication of Case 1. Case 2 is therefore the 
mean coefficient of all the countries in the sample. According to the requirement for 
money illusion under Case 2, on average the results show that money illusion is present.  
Table 4.6 reports results of the regression analysis using positive inflation shock. Similar 
to the results in Table 4.5, Table 4.6 shows that the estimated betas for the countries in 
the sample are all less than one. The results make it impossible to evaluate Case 3 for the 
presence of money illusion and only Case 4 is examined. For the presence of money 
illusion under Case 4 to be satisfied, the mean coefficient of the inflation variable must be 
positive and significant. The results show that the required sign to demonstrate the 
presence of money illusion is satisfied but not significant. 
Since only Cases 2 and 4 are present in the results in this sub-section and of these 
cases only Case 2 is significant, there may not be sufficient evidence to suggest money 
illusion in emerging markets.  
4.5 Robustness   
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In this section I examine minor adjustment to the proposed hypotheses in this chapter. I 
include Fama-French size and value factors in the empirical model. According to Fama 
and French (1993), size and value premia may matter for asset pricing. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
present results for the developed nations. Table 4.7 evaluates the empirical implication of 
money illusion for periods of negative inflation shocks by looking at Case 1 and Case 2. 
Case 1 has the right sign but the mean coefficient is not significant. Case 2 has the right 
sign and it is significant at 95% confidence level. Table 4.8 presents the analysis over 
periods of positive inflation shocks for developed nations. The results show that both 
Case 3 and Case 4 are negative and significant. The presence of money illusion requires 
Case 3 to be negative and Case 4 to be positive. These results are consistent with the 
results in the main study. The evidence shows that of the four cases, three satisfy the 
expected sign with two being significant at 95% confidence level. 
 Robustness checks are conducted for the emerging market countries. The Fama-
French size and vaule factors are included in the empirical model in equation 4.7. There 
are no significant changes in the results as compared to the results in the main 
presentation. In both Tables 4.9 and 4.10, the estimated betas for the countries in the 
sample are less than one. This eliminates Case 1 and Case 3. Results presented in Table 
3.9 and 3.10 have Case 2 and Case 4 respectively. The result for Case 2 in Table 4.9 
endorses the presence of money illusion, and the result is significant. The results for Case 
4 in Table 4.10 have the expected sign, but it is not significant.  
The focus of this chapter is to evaluate the presence of money illusion in 
developed and emerging markets. Since contrasting the two markets is not the objective 
for this research, the difference in the time periods of the two data sets may not be an 
important issue of great concern. However, I present results for the developed market 
from 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in Table 4.11 show no significant difference to the 
results for the data period 1970:01 – 2005:12.  Thus periods of negative inflation shocks, 
the expected results for case 1 and case 2 under the hypothesis are significant and they 
both have the require sign for the regression coefficients. Table 4.12 present results for 
periods with positive inflation shocks from 1987:01 – 2005:12. The observed signs of the 
results both for case 3 and case 4 are consistent with the model requirement for the 
presence of money illusion in the stock market. This shows an improvement over the 
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results covering the period 1970:01 – 2005:12.  However, in both case 3 and case 4, the 
results are not significant.  
The findings in the robustness section show that minor changes in the main 
assumption do not affect the outcome of the results. There is reasonable evidence to 
support the presence of money illusion in developed markets. However, not enough 
evidence is presented to support money illusion in emerging markets. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In general there is reasonable evidence to suggest the presence of money illusion in 
developed markets as demonstrated by the results in this chapter. As discussed, more 
market integration of the international financial market provides for easy flow of capital 
from one country to the other. If stocks in one market are viewed by investors as not 
offering a competitive yield, investors would re-allocate their investments to markets 
offering competitive yields. Competition among markets may present the linkage for 
money illusion to affect international markets.  
However, emerging markets may suffer from relatively more frictions in the flow 
of capital and information between countries. In the presence of friction and information 
problems, emerging market stocks may not react competitively to stock price movements 
of other markets. In effect, the lack of frictionless integration may insulate emerging 
markets from the spillover of money illusion from foreign sources. Also, the bond 
markets in emerging markets are not well developed to ensure bond – stock competition 
that may influence domestically generated money illusion.    
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Table 4.1 
Average Inflation for All Data Period and Average Inflation for Periods of Positive 
and Negative Inflation Shocks 
 
Summary results of average (annualized) inflation level of countries in the data sample for the period 1970:01– 
2005:12. All inflation represents the annualized monthly average for all the time period of the data. Negative shock 
segment represent the annualized monthly average for periods of negative inflation shocks and positive shock represent 
the annualized monthly average for periods with positive inflation shocks.  Inflation for each of the 16 countries is 
computed by estimating the annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each month and average 
across the data period (1970 – 2005).  
 
 
  
  All Inflation Negative Shock Positive Shock  
Germany 2.515 2.492 3.529 
Austria 3.779 3.105 4.590 
Belgium 3.845 3.794 4.791 
Canada 4.872 4.123 5.609 
Denmark 5.447 4.782 6.163 
France 5.364 4.599 6.347 
Italy 8.179 7.159 9.467 
Japan 3.490 3.463 5.711 
Netherlands 3.902 3.739 4.393 
Norway 5.654 5.131 6.480 
Singapore 3.106 2.715 4.517 
Spain 8.565 7.841 9.421 
Sweden 5.733 5.100 6.881 
Switzerland 3.104 2.320 3.934 
United Kingdom 7.030 5.587 8.394 
United States 4.799 3.958 5.631 
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Mean Excess Returns of data from Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Table 4.2 
Table reports the average market returns for the 16 countries in the data sample. The market returns are 
used as the country portfolios and are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) price 
indices with dividends. The sample data for the sixteen developed countries span the period 1970:01 – 
2005:12. 
 
 
  Mean Std. Err. [95% Confidence Interval] 
          
Austria 0.76 0.342 0.087 1.432 
Belgium 0.88 0.2843 0.320 1.438 
France 0.81 0.3378 0.143 1.472 
Italy 0.62 0.3884 -0.146 1.382 
Netherlands 0.89 0.2714 0.359 1.426 
Norway 0.76 0.3783 0.018 1.506 
Singapore 0.79 0.4079 -0.010 1.594 
Spain 0.55 0.3402 -0.124 1.214 
Sweden 0.94 0.348 0.258 1.626 
Switzerland 0.71 0.268 0.183 1.237 
United Kingdom 0.98 0.3338 0.318 1.631 
Japan 0.57 0.3375 -0.092 1.235 
Germany 0.63 0.3083 0.025 1.237 
United States 0.68 0.2315 0.223 1.133 
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Table 4.3 
Regression Results for Developed Countries Using Negative Inflation Shocks  
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) price indices with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1970:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with negative inflation shock. 
Case 1 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1>iβ ,  and Case 2 is the 
mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Negative Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World Inf-Alpha   Ex-World Inf-Alpha 
Germany 0.866 -0.0845  8.38 -1.59 
Austria 0.541 0.0014  5.37 0.76 
Belgium 1.004 -0.0095  10.87 -1.64 
Canada 0.689 -0.0532  9.15 -0.60 
Denmark 0.829 0.0018  8.22 2.06 
France 1.030 -0.0074  11.45 -0.47 
Italy 1.001 0.0696  7.16 -0.07 
Japan 1.029 -0.0087  11.84 -1.07 
Netherlands 0.866 -0.0235  11.22 -0.22 
United States 0.927 0.0010  14.44 1.32 
United Kingdom 0.992 -0.0110  11.09 -0.20 
Norway 1.017 -0.0016  8.28 -1.02 
Spain 1.015 0.0132  9.73 1.24 
Sweden 0.987 -0.0303  8.34 -2.95 
Switzerland 0.810 -0.0101  10.08 -1.02 
Singapore 1.003 -0.0028   8.17 -0.53 
Average           
Case 1 1.014 0.0075  221.08 0.70 
       
Case 2 0.834 -0.0232   17.35 -2.37 
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Table 4.4 
Regression Results for Developed Countries Using Positive Inflation Shocks  
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) price indices with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1970:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with positive inflation shock. 
Case 3 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1>iβ ,  and Case 4 is the 
mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Positive Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World Inf-Alpha   Ex-World Inf-Alpha 
Germany 1.068 0.0057  11.74 1.16 
Austria 0.622 -0.0042  5.78 -0.21 
Belgium 0.982 0.0031  10.19 0.59 
Canada 1.039 0.0013  13.77 0.97 
Denmark 0.786 -0.0024  8.48 -2.64 
France 1.057 -0.0153  12.05 -1.05 
Italy 0.948 -0.0062  8.01 -0.76 
Japan 0.985 -0.0017  10.17 -2.53 
Netherlands 1.076 -0.0203  14.89 -1.49 
United States 1.004 -0.0264  16.56 -3.17 
United Kingdom 1.013 0.0061  13.67 0.77 
Norway 0.844 -0.0012  7.10 -1.15 
Spain 0.786 -0.0029  8.26 -3.46 
Sweden 1.038 0.0032  11.68 0.30 
Switzerland 1.007 -0.0189  11.78 -1.43 
Singapore 1.088 -0.0526   9.74 -0.88 
Average           
Case 3 1.043 -0.0209  101.36 -1.95®
  
 
     
Case 4 0.850 -0.0022   16.97 -2.02 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
® Result is influenced significantly by outliers in Singapore’s observed  inflation minus the expected 
inflation. 
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Table 4.5 
Regression Results for Emerging Countries Using Negative Inflation Shocks  
 
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from the Emerging Market 
Database (EMDB) stock series with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with negative inflation shock. 
Case 1 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1>iβ ,  and Case 2 is the 
mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Negative Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World Inf-Alpha   Ex-World Inf-Alpha 
Argentina 0.480 -0.0011  2.48 -3.22 
Chile 0.203 -0.0014  1.80 -1.18 
Colombia 0.101 -0.0068  0.68 -0.38 
Greece 0.507 -0.0051  3.21 -2.51 
India -0.142 -0.0021  -0.96 -1.45 
Jordan 0.111 0.0012  2.02 0.31 
S. Korea 0.363 -0.0053  2.90 -2.65 
Malaysia 0.547 -0.0052  4.34 -1.19 
Mexico 0.577 -0.0047  4.08 -2.07 
Nigeria -0.001 -0.0049  -0.01 -3.73 
Pakistan -0.109 -0.0266  -0.59 -0.96 
Philippines 0.435 0.0022  3.77 1.97 
Thailand 0.491 0.0004  3.58 0.02 
Turkey 0.833 -0.0086  3.54 -0.96 
Venezuela -0.011 -0.0014  -0.05 -2.91 
Zimbabwe 0.040 -0.0042   0.38 -5.86 
Average           
Case 2 0.277 -0.0046  3.83 -2.79 
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Table 4.6  
Regression Results for Emerging Countries Using Positive Inflation Shocks  
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from the Emerging Market 
Database (EMDB) stock series with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frur πββµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with positive inflation 
shock. Case 3 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1>iβ , and Case 4 is 
the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Positive Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World Inf-Alpha   Ex-World Inf-Alpha 
Argentina -0.008 0.0019  -0.02 3.46 
Chile 0.144 0.0024  2.17 2.83 
Colombia 0.009 -0.0027  0.06 -1.17 
Greece 0.180 0.0074  1.26 2.69 
India 0.042 -0.0044  0.26 -2.36 
Jordan 0.058 -0.0012  1.00 -4.00 
S. Korea 0.599 0.0015  3.63 0.52 
Malaysia 0.600 -0.0021  4.83 -0.54 
Mexico 0.783 0.0014  4.56 2.91 
Nigeria 0.283 -0.0008  1.24 -0.14 
Pakistan 0.186 0.0068  1.94 0.50 
Philippines 0.647 0.0048  4.14 0.28 
Thailand 0.760 -0.0051  5.38 -1.70 
Turkey -0.209 0.0085  -0.72 1.03 
Venezuela 0.062 -0.0023  0.32 -0.56 
Zimbabwe 0.313 -0.0032   2.30 -0.57 
Average           
Case 4 0.278 0.0008  3.63 0.76 
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Table 4.7 
Regression Results for Developed Countries Using Negative Inflation Shocks with 
Fama-French 3 Factor Correction 
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) price indices with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1970:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with negative inflation shock. 
SMB and HML are the Fama-French size and value factors. Case 1 is the mean coefficients of all the countries 
where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1>iβ ,  and Case 2 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 
0)( <− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Negative Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha   Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha 
Germany 0.902 0.006 0.073 -0.077  8.28 0.10 1.11 -1.43 
Austria 0.585 0.017 0.090 0.002  5.49 0.30 1.41 0.98 
Belgium 1.012 -0.007 0.158 -0.008  11.23 -0.13 2.63 -1.45 
Canada 0.693 0.026 0.021 -0.045  8.70 0.61 0.43 -0.49 
Denmark 0.908 -0.072 0.112 0.002  8.60 -1.24 1.74 2.34 
France 1.037 -0.119 0.059 -0.004  11.45 -1.84 0.81 -0.26 
Italy 1.013 -0.042 0.196 0.024  7.60 -0.51 2.19 0.22 
Japan 1.029 0.049 0.012 -0.008  11.14 0.77 0.17 -0.97 
Netherlands 0.915 0.029 0.110 0.006  11.30 0.65 2.26 0.06 
United States 0.891 -0.037 -0.089 0.007  13.20 -1.00 -2.18 0.89 
United Kingdom 0.991 0.021 0.011 -0.008  10.51 0.41 0.19 -0.14 
Norway 1.021 0.056 0.111 -0.001  8.13 0.69 1.25 -0.91 
Spain 1.019 0.034 0.081 0.014  9.49 0.50 1.08 1.32 
Sweden 1.000 0.146 0.104 -0.028  8.03 2.18 1.40 -2.71 
Switzerland 0.843 0.025 0.078 -0.075  9.96 0.54 1.52 -0.74 
Singapore 1.003 0.087 0.047 -0.002   7.73 1.20 0.58 -0.38 
Average          
Case 1 1.019 0.008 0.095 0.002  240.90 0.31 3.89 0.42 
           
Case 2 0.859 0.018 0.057 -0.024   18.89 0.91 2.58 -2.10 
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Table 4.8 
Regression Results for Developed Countries Using Positive Inflation Shocks with 
Fama-French 3 Factor Correction 
 
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) price indices with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1970:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with positive inflation shock. 
SMB and HML are the Fama-French size and value factors. Case 3 is the mean coefficients of all the countries 
where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1>iβ , and Case 4 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 
0)( >− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Positive Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha   Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha 
Germany 1.017 0.041 -0.074 0.0065  10.66 0.72 -1.17 1.31 
Austria 0.637 0.020 0.043 -0.0058  5.62 0.32 0.63 -0.29 
Belgium 1.003 0.098 0.150 0.0027  10.20 1.78 2.48 0.51 
Canada 1.022 0.057 0.001 0.0013  12.89 1.10 0.03 0.96 
Denmark 0.844 -0.114 0.045 -0.0025  8.71 -2.15 0.78 -2.70 
France 1.018 0.034 0.142 -0.0180  12.07 0.58 2.15 -1.23 
Italy 0.960 0.032 0.042 -0.0067  7.70 0.47 0.56 -0.82 
Japan 0.993 0.062 0.055 -0.0017  9.77 1.11 0.89 -2.58 
Netherlands 1.006 0.053 0.089 -0.0218  14.55 1.16 1.78 -1.60 
United States 1.002 0.061 -0.124 -0.0224  14.84 1.63 -2.95 -2.70 
United Kingdom 1.083 0.136 0.217 0.0040  13.69 2.03 2.93 0.51 
Norway 0.882 -0.019 0.062 -0.0013  7.03 -0.28 0.82 -1.23 
Spain 0.788 -0.014 -0.004 -0.0029  7.87 -0.26 -0.06 -3.39 
Sweden 1.025 0.056 0.008 0.0030  10.99 0.85 0.11 0.27 
Switzerland 1.010 0.017 0.057 -0.0200  11.45 0.32 0.99 -1.50 
Singapore 1.038 0.090 -0.045 -0.0497   8.95 1.10 -0.50 -0.83 
Average          
Case 3 1.024 0.061 0.030 -0.0070  126.16 5.23 0.84 -1.82®
  
 
         
Case 4 0.872 0.009 0.056 -0.0026   17.67 0.36 3.20 -3.83 
 
 
                                                 
® Result is influenced significantly by outliers in Singapore’s observed  inflation minus the expected 
inflation. 
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Table 4.9 
Regression Results for Emerging Countries Using Negative Inflation Shocks with 
Fama-French 3 Factor Correction 
 
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from the Emerging Market 
Database (EMDB) stock series with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with negative inflation shock.  
SMB and HML are the Fama-French size and value factors. Case 1 is the mean coefficients of all the countries 
where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1>iβ , and Case 2 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 
0)( <− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Negative Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha   Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha 
Argentina 0.512 0.388 0.172 -0.0012  2.44 1.48 0.55 -3.28 
Chile 0.221 0.274 0.105 -0.0013  1.81 1.81 0.58 -1.13 
Colombia 0.072 0.162 -0.087 -0.0047  0.44 0.79 -0.36 -0.26 
Greece 0.509 0.123 0.025 -0.0051  2.94 0.57 0.10 -2.48 
India -0.149 0.532 0.036 -0.0015  -0.95 2.69 0.15 -1.05 
Jordan 0.123 0.060 0.055 0.0009  2.06 0.80 0.61 0.22 
S. Korea 0.274 0.123 -0.304 -0.0052  2.03 0.73 -1.50 -2.64 
Malaysia 0.604 0.308 0.248 -0.0043  4.43 1.78 1.21 -0.96 
Mexico 0.480 0.426 -0.274 -0.0052  3.22 2.28 -1.22 -2.36 
Nigeria -0.026 -0.050 -0.100 -0.0047  -0.43 -0.65 -1.08 -3.58 
Pakistan -0.042 0.934 0.410 -0.0033  -0.22 3.87 1.42 -1.25 
Philippines 0.551 0.074 0.426 0.0025  4.43 0.47 2.25 2.29 
Thailand 0.513 -0.040 0.076 -0.0005  3.44 -0.21 0.34 -0.02 
Turkey 0.787 0.175 -0.131 -0.0092  3.06 0.55 -0.34 -1.03 
Venezuela -0.107 0.195 -0.311 -0.0014  -0.45 0.66 -0.88 -2.91 
Zimbabwe -0.008 0.074 -0.161 -0.0043   -0.07 0.50 -0.90 -5.94 
Average          
Case 2 0.270 0.235 0.012 -0.003  3.64 3.80 0.20 -4.19 
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Table 4.10 
Regression Results for Emerging Countries Using Positive Inflation Shocks with 
Fama-French 3 Factor Correction 
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from the Emerging Market 
Database (EMDB) stock series with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with positive inflation shock. 
SMB and HML are the Fama-French size and value factors. Case 3 is the mean coefficients of all the countries 
where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1>iβ , and Case 4 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 
0)( >− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha   Ex-World SMB HML Inf-Alpha 
Argentina 0.048 0.492 0.279 0.0020  0.14 1.12 0.53 3.54 
Chile 0.143 0.135 0.012 0.0026  1.97 1.47 0.11 2.99 
Colombia 0.003 -0.157 -0.044 -0.0029  0.02 -0.75 -0.17 -1.21 
Greece 0.180 0.113 0.018 0.0075  1.15 0.57 0.07 2.71 
India -0.029 -0.220 -0.297 -0.0047  -0.16 -0.98 -1.11 -2.50 
Jordan 0.038 -0.002 -0.072 -0.0012  0.61 -0.03 -0.76 -3.99 
S. Korea 0.481 -0.265 -0.470 0.0019  2.68 -1.18 -1.74 0.63 
Malaysia 0.582 0.124 -0.042 -0.0019  4.30 0.73 -0.21 -0.49 
Mexico 0.799 0.105 0.076 0.0014  4.26 0.45 0.27 2.88 
Nigeria 0.364 0.189 0.315 -0.0018  1.45 0.60 0.82 -0.29 
Pakistan 0.174 -0.008 -0.045 0.0072  1.66 -0.06 -0.28 0.52 
Philippines 0.671 0.257 0.130 0.0056  3.94 1.20 0.51 0.33 
Thailand 0.723 0.117 -0.114 -0.0047  4.69 0.60 -0.49 -1.55 
Turkey -0.335 -0.421 -0.507 0.0097  -1.05 -1.06 -1.06 1.15 
Venezuela -0.030 -0.070 -0.341 -0.0023  -0.14 -0.26 -1.07 -0.56 
Zimbabwe 0.144 -0.040 -0.627 -0.0050   1.00 -0.22 -2.87 -0.90 
Average          
Case 4 0.247 0.022 -0.108 0.001  3.07 0.39 -1.59 0.72 
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Table 4.11 
Regression Results for Developed Countries Using Negative Inflation Shocks  
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) price indices with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with negative inflation shock. 
Case 1 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1>iβ ,  and Case 2 is the 
mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( <− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Negative Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  Ex-World Inf-Alpha   Ex-World Inf-Alpha 
Germany  0.875 -0.0180  8.53 -2.02 
Austria  0.576 0.0017  5.39 0.93 
Belgium  1.005 0.0180  9.50 0.18 
Canada  0.691 -0.0070  9.37 -0.98 
Denmark  0.917 0.0010  8.12 0.10 
France  1.003 0.0042  12.36 0.26 
Italy  1.001 0.0054  5.09 0.51 
Japan  1.005 0.0092  10.90 0.48 
Netherlands  0.955 -0.0091  11.10 -1.35 
United States  0.892 -0.0012  14.31 -2.28 
United Kingdom  0.996 0.0017  11.16 1.01 
Norway  1.065 -0.0212  8.32 -2.02 
Spain  1.011 0.0097  9.51 0.86 
Sweden  1.006 -0.0014  8.73 -0.39 
Switzerland  0.902 -0.0097  10.14 -0.18 
Singapore  1.007 0.0041   8.24 0.77 
Average      
Case 1 1.013 0.0035  134.51 0.87 
       
Case 2 0.851 -0.0051   16.89 -2.02 
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Table 4.12 
Regression Results for Developed Countries Using Positive Inflation Shocks  
Table presents a time series regression of excess return of country portfolios against world excess returns (Ex-
World) and inflation shock variable (Inf-Alpha). Country portfolios are estimated from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) price indices with dividends. One year lagged inflation is used as the estimate of expected 
inflation and the difference between observed inflation and expected inflation is the inflation shock variable. 
The sample data covers sixteen developed countries over the period 1987:01 – 2005:12. The results in the table 
are based on regression ( ) ( ) ( )tiinfmtinfit frr πβµβµ −+−=− 1ˆˆ  covering periods with positive inflation shock. 
Case 3 is the mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1>iβ ,  and Case 4 is the 
mean coefficients of all the countries where for 0)( >− itit ππ  and 1<iβ  . 
 
 
 
Positive Shock Coefficients   T-values 
  
Ex-
World Inf-Alpha   Ex-World Inf-Alpha 
Germany  1.168 0.0157  11.74 1.16 
Austria  0.522 -0.0142  5.78 -0.21 
Belgium  0.902 0.0231  10.19 0.59 
Canada  1.089 0.0013  13.77 0.97 
Denmark  0.864 0.0240  8.48 -2.64 
France  1.217 -0.0153  12.05 -1.05 
Italy  0.895 -0.0162  8.01 -0.76 
Japan  0.915 0.0170  10.17 -2.53 
Netherlands  1.176 -0.0203  14.89 -1.49 
United States  1.104 -0.0264  16.56 -3.17 
United Kingdom  1.131 0.0161  13.67 0.77 
Norway  0.844 0.0120  7.10 -1.15 
Spain  0.857 0.0292  8.26 -3.46 
Sweden  1.138 0.0132  11.68 0.30 
Switzerland  1.073 -0.0189  11.78 -1.43 
Singapore  1.188 -0.0153   9.74 -0.88 
Average      
Case 3 1.143 -0.0055  70.99 -0.97 
       
Case 4 0.828 0.0107   15.92 1.53 
 
 
 
